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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THAD L. HATCH, et al 
CONNIE LIETZ, et al 
JAMES P. XENAKIS, et al 
Plaiinti ff s and Appellants 
vs. 
GARRETT FREIGHT LINES, INC., a 
corporation, 








STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case arose out of a collision which occurred on 
U. S. Highway 91 about 5 :30 A. M. on October 19, 1951 
on a long curve a few miles south of Kanosh, Millard 
County, Utah. Defendant Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. 
was driving and operating its tractor and semi trailer 
south. The north bound car was a 1951 model green 
Studebaker in which was riding Captain James P. 
Xenakis, Connie Lietz, her daughter Joanne Lietz, Cap-
tain Herbert Sheldon Neeshan and his son Robert 
Neeshan. 
Captain Xenakis, Mrs. Lietz and her child had driven 
·from Phoenix to Las Vegas where they picked up Cap-
tain Neeshan and his son and were traveling to Salt 
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Lake to go deer hunting. They had been driving all 
night. The last known stop prior to the collision was at 
St. George, where Captain N eeshan (according to Mrs. 
Lietz' statement to the investigating officers) had taken 
over the wheel. Except for this statement there is no 
proof as to who was driving the Studebaker. 
All occupants of the Studebaker were instantly 
killed except Mrs. Lietz who was asleep in the rear seat. 
The five actions were filed, four alleged death claims 
and the personal injury claim of Mrs. Lietz. All were 
consolidated for jury trial before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett. 
DEFENDANT'S THEORY 
Defendant's evidence, based on the testimony of eye 
witnesses and the physical facts described by the investi-
gating officers, showed that the Studebaker as it 
approached and came into the curve was traveling about 
80 miles per hour. Its right wheels traveled along the 
right gravel shoulder about 200 feet when it suddenly 
swerved out of control and directly across the highway 
into violent collision with the defendant's tractor on 
defendant's right hand side at a point which eye wit-
nesses estimate to have been three or four feet from the 
shoulder. 
PLAINTIF'F'S' THEORY 
Plaintiffs' theory was that the defendant's truck was 
driven onto the wrong side of the highway just prior to 
the collision, causing a collision between the two vehicles 
while the Studebaker was well within its right hand or 
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ISSUE AS TO LIABILITY 
To show the agreed issues it has been necessary to 
supplement the Record on appeal to include the pre-
trial and hearing on defendant's Motion for Sumnmry 
J udgn1ent before the trial judge, Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
on December 27, 1952 (R. 859-69). The Motion F'or 'Sum-
mary Judgment was based on affidavits and depositions 
of eye witnesses, which showed that the collision occurred 
well on defendant's side near its right shoulder. Plain-
tiffs presented nothing to the contrary. The court pointed 
out that the Motion was not controverted and that plain-
tiffs would have to indicate in what respect there would 
be any issue or issues for the court or jury to try, to 
which counsel responded: 
"Mr. Schoenhals: It happened on my side of 
the highway, Your Honor." (R. 868) 
Plaintiffs' counsel then proceeded to comment on 
the matter of brakes, claiming that if defendant's brakes 
were defective it would tend to pull the tractor onto the 
wrong side. To this the court said and counsel answered: 
"THE COURT: That goes to the wrong side. 
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes." (R. 868) 
No further claim was made by Plaintiffs' and it 
was agreed in open court that the question of liability 
would first be determined in the form of a special verdict 
(R. 361). 
SPECIAL VERDICTS 
The following special verdicts were submitted and 
unanimously anslWered by the jurors as follows: 
"Question No. 1. Do you find by a prepon-
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derance of the evidence in this case that the trac-
tor or the Studebaker, or either of them, was 
negligently driven to the left of the center of the 
highway immediately preceding the collision 
involved in this lawsuit~ 
"Answer ('Yes or No') Yes 
"Question No. 2. If your answer to Question 
No. 1 · is 'Yes', name the vehicles which you so 
found was negligently driven across the center of 
the highway. 
"Answer: Studebaker" (R. 219) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It would be impossible to agree with Appellants' 
Statement Of Facts, which consists essentially of self 
serving conclusions contrary to the actual physical evi-
dence and testimony of eye witnesses. We will, therefore, 
undertake to set forth the facts as developed by both 
parties. 
EYE WITNESSES 
There were dis-interested eye witnesses, residents of 
Kaysville, who were going deer hunting, namely Hal 
Noyes, James Faile and Roy Talbot, riding in a 1949 
Ford pickup truck which was following defendant's rig. 
Roy Talbot, riding in the center of the front seat, was 
asleep when the collision occurred but Noyes and Faile 
both observed the collision. 
HAL NoYES 
Hal Noyes, who was riding on the right hand side 
of the pickup, testified: That they had followed the Gar-
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traveling about 150 to :250 feet behind defendant's truck 
(R. 373--1). It was just as dawn was breaking (R. 743). 
He observed the Studebaker automobile before the 
collision and saw the impact (R. 734). He saw two 
bodies come through the windshie_ld of the Studebaker 
(R. 7-10). He Inarked an ".X" on Exhibit 1 showing the 
approximate place of impact just north of the point 
between the ~Iobile Gas sign and the forked fence post 
near defendant's right hand shoulder (R. 737). He said 
the point of impact was not more .than four feet from 
defendant's right shoulder (R. 738). 
With respect to the Studebaker, he testified he saw 
it from the time it came over a hill on the long stretch 
approaching the curve, traveling at least 80 miles per 
hour (R. 739). 
He testified defendant's truck was traveling e~&­
tremely close to his right shoulder and observed the 
driver turn his lights to "low beam" (R. 736-7). Defend-
ant's tractor and trailer did not make any change in its 
course of travel except 
"Immediately before the impact, just a matter 
of, well, almost too short a time to mention, the 
truck driver did steer his wheels to the left to 
avoid the i1npact." 
Thereafter the truck continued on across the highway 
after the impact (R. 7 43-4). He estimated his own speed 
and that of defendant's tractor as between 35 and 40 
miles per hour (R. 738). 
He and his companions after stopping on the right 
hand side immediately got out to assist the injured (R. 
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740). Among other things they kicked the debris to the 
side so that cars coming from both directions could go 
between the rear of the trailer and the seats of the Stude-
baker (R. 741). He did not know any of the people 
involved in the accident. 
JAMES FAILE 
James F·aile, driver of the pickup, testified: That 
he was following about 200 to 250 feet behind defendant's 
rig at about 35 miles per hour. He saw the Studebaker 
quite a ways up the road before the impact and observed 
its spot light blink on and off (R. 780). The Studebaker 
was traveling 70 to 80 miles per hour. 
"He (the Studebaker) came down and just 
before it got to the truck it swerved across" and 
"came off the side" as he, Faile, was trying to 
stop. At the time the Studebaker collided with it, 
defendant's truck "was traveling close to the edge 
of the oil on the right hand side" ( R. 781). He 
(defendant's driver) turned just a little to the 
left; "looked like he was trying to miss ... " 
He, Faile, carne to a stop on the right hand side about 
50 feet back of defendant's trailer (R. 782). He assisted 
in putting out flares and some of the debris was moved 
so traffic could get through ( R. 782-3). 
LAREN SoMSEN 
Laren Somsen, defendant's driver, testified that he 
resides in Murray; that he had been driving for the 
Garrett Freight Lines since 1944 and was still employed 
in the same capacity (R. 531). While so employed his 
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He left Salt Lake City on October 19, the day of the 
accident, about 1~ :30 A. l\L He stopped at Fillmore 
about 5:00 A. ~I. (R. 532) and made the usual check of 
his equipment (R. 533). He passed through Kanosh. 
In approaching the curve he said: 
"I was traveling on my side of the road and 
as I approached this curve you could see the lights 
of a car coming off the hill * * *. As I went into 
the curve I dimmed my headlights. * * * As I 
got most of the way through the curve, these 
lights appeared. * * * Coming towards n1e off the 
hill. That is the lights coming from the Stude-
baker traveling north on the highway (R. 534). 
The lights suddenly took off toward the wrong 
side of the highway toward me. * * * Naturally 
I hit the brakes. I swore, I think I jerked the 
steering wheel at the same time, but it was all 
over that fast. I was hit at the same time. It was 
all simultaneous. I was thrown against the steer-
ing wheel. * * * It jarred me enough that my 
foot came off the brake, I grabbed the hand valve 
and set the brakes on the trailer and brought the 
outfit to a stop. * * * Until he swerved toward 
me, I was traveling approximately two or three 
feet from the center of the road." (Possible two 
or three feet from the west edge of the hard sur-
face (R.. 535).) 
He explained that as the Studebaker approached the 
curve the driver was using the spot light which blinked 
on and off (R. 549). The spot light went off when the 
car (Studebaker) went out of control (R.543). It 
appeared to him that the Studebaker approached between 
80 and 90 miles per hour (R. 537) and was about 100 
feet away when it went out of control across the highway 
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(R. 537, 573). He said: 
"He was right on his side of the road when 
he went out of control. * * * He shot across the 
highway and then his lights straightened up 
towards me and that is all." (R. 5:18) 
Prior to the accident he had occasion to use his 
brakes frequently and they were in good working order 
(R. 531). l-Ie made the usual check of his equipment at 
Fillmore about 5:00A.M. (R. 533). The load was 56,000 
to 57,000 pounds ( R. 543). 
He and Sheriff Culbert Robinson appear in Exhibit 
"F", a picture where they are p()inting to marks made 
by the Studebaker crossing the highway (R. 539). 'rhese 
fresh marks were traced from where they commenced on 
the east or southeast shoulder of the highway to where 
they shot across the highway, thernafter leaving the 
highway where it (the Studebaker) spun around. They 
also traced and observed the marks of defendant's truck 
(R. 539, 540). 
By stipulation the tachograph was received in eYi-
dence showing the speed of the defendant's tractor at 
approximately 37 miles per hour (R. 544). It wnt' 
explained that the tachograph records the stops and the 
speed of the tractor (R. 545). 
PHYSICAL EviDENCE 
The accident was investigated the morning it hap-
pened by Sheriff Culbert Robinson of Millard ('ounty, 
Highway Patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood of Nephi a.nd 
Patrolman Stanley White. Pictures were taken by Lamar 
Brunson of Fillmore (about 9:00 A. M., R. 609) under ~ 
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Exhibit F-Looking North 
Exhibit N- Looking North 
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the direction of and at the request of Sheriff Hobinson 
(R. 60-!). These pictures show the tire marks of the two 
vehicles and their danmged condition and the general 
scene of the accident. 
At the trial counsel for plaintiffs used huge enlarge-
ment of these photographs (see Exhibit A-F) and encum-
bered the Record with so many photographs, reprints, 
drawings, charts and other exhibits as to niake it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to follow the Record. To assist 
the reader, therefore, we have herein reproduced a few 
of the pertinent eo,.xhibits, including the map prepared 
by W. Y. Tipton showing the curve. 
CuLBERT RoBINSON 
Culbert Robinson, Sheriff of Millard County, testi-
fied that he had been sheriff of the county for ten years 
and he received a phone call around a quarter to six and 
immediately left Fillmore to go to the scene of the acci-
dent, 16 miles (R. 588). After attending to the injured 
and making sure there were flag1nen (R. 589) he made an 
examination for brake n1arks of both vehicles, Exhibit 
B (R. 590). When he first arrived at the scene it was 
light enough to clearly see the marks (R. 609). He was 
assisted in the investigation and taking of measurements 
by Highway Patrolman Stanley White and Eldon Sher-
wood. 
He traced the tire marks of both cars. On Exhibit 
B he placed a small ''X" on the two tire marks of the 
~tudebaker leading into the debris (R. 591-2). 
With reference to Exhibit N, another picture taken 
~~~, 1\fr. Brunson (R. 592), Sheriff Robinson is shown 
·9 
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pointing to the Studebaker n1arks crossing the highway 
and beyond on the opposite side ).Ir. Son1sen is pointing 
with another baton where Robinson had him point from 
where these tire marks could be followed "through to 
where it came to rest." He could also follow these tire 
marks back the other direction south along the shoulder 
(R. 579) for an overall distance of 328 feet, that is, the 
entire distance along the shoulder and across the high-
way and into the debris (R. 597, 601). With reference 
to these marks, and in particular with reference to the 
marks crossing the highway shown in Exhibit F, he said 
the mark was that of a "tire mark" as distinguished from 
a "brake mark" and said 
"There were markings of the tread on the 
highway that showed the markings were the same 
as on the side of the tire." (Studebaker) (R. 601). 
He was present when Mr. Tipton made his measurements 
and prepared the map (R. 619). 
These marks he drew for illustrative purposes along 
the shoulder and across the highway as shown on Exhibit 
16 (R. 599, 600-1). 
He was unable to find any north bound tire marks 
on defendant's left hand side or the east side of the high-
way (as testified to by plaintiffs' witnesses Bowman, 
Middleton and Staples, R. 593). 
STANLEY WHITE 
Highway Patrollnan \Vhite received a call just prior 
to 8:00 A .. M. He first went to the hospital at Fillmore 
(R. 621). There he conferred with Dr. Freeman and 
saw the injured. He then proceeded to the scene and with 
10 
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Sheriff Robinson n1ade a prelin1inary investigation 
stepping off the distances (R. 622). Upon arrival of 
Patrolman Sherwood they recorded the measurements 
with a tape. They took the measurements from a point 
designated as the '"erescent" (see Exhibit 12) near the 
point of impact on the northwest side of the road. They 
measured the marks of the Studebaker which were trace-
able, conrmencing from the south on the east gravel 
shoulder 3:28 feet south of the accident (R. 624). This tire 
mark was followed ~00 feet along the east shoulder where 
it left the shoulder, crossing the hard surface portion of 
the highway at an angle (R. 625) (Exhibit F') and then 
into the debris on the opposite side (R. 636). He des-
cribed the right wheel mark along the shoulder and to 
a point until after it crossed the center of the highway as 
being darker and more distinct. Thereafter, as the marks 
turned, then the opposite side or the left tire marks lead-
ing into the debris were the darker (R. 625-6, Exhibit B). 
It was roughly one-third of the total distance of 328 
feet (or approximately 109 feet) from the crescent or 
approximate point of impact to where the Studebaker 
marks left the shoulder to cross the hard surface, swerv-
ing into the debris on the opposite side (R. 636). They 
traced the wobbley flat tire marks from the approximate 
place of impact through to the right front tire of defend-
ant's tractor. It was blown out at the time of in1pact 
(see Exhibits "B" and 12). 
Other measurements were made, it being 39 feet 
from the crescent to the rear of the defendant's tractor 
(H. G22), 60 feet from the crescent to the engine of the 
11 
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Studebaker which from the force of the i1npact was 
throlwn into the field to the northwest ( R. 628), 12 feet 
from the "crescent" to the Studebaker which crune to 
rest west of the highway (R. 633) and 7 feet from the 
center of the highway to the "crescent" or gouge mark 
(see Exhibit 12, R. 635-6). 
He said there were no other wavey or irregular tire 
marks other than that of the flat tire (R. 631) and he 
was unable to find any tire marks of any north bound 
vehicles such as those described by witnesses Bowman 
et al. There were "no other marks on the highway" (R. 
628). 
CRESCENT 
The only explanation of the "crescent" or "gouge" 
mark, vaguely shown in the form of an arc (Exhibit 12) 
well on defendant's side of the highway was the testimony 
of Sam Taylor, who made an inspection of the mark and 
the Studebaker and found that the width of the "crescent" 
and the rim of the Studebaker both measured appr~~­
mately five inches. He also found that the left front rim 
of the Studebaker where the tire was flattened and torn 
loose (see Exhibit "D") was bent on both the outside 
and inside lip (R. 669-70-71). This was the only evidence 
of the actual cause of the "crescent", from which point 
the measurements of the investigating officers were 
made. 
ELDON c. SHERWOOD 
Eldon C. Sherwood, a highway patrolman from 
Nephi, similarly identified the wobbley flat tire marks 
in Exhibit "B" which he could clearl)' trace from the area 
12 
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of the wreckage to the right front flat tire of the defend-
ant's truck (H. 641-:2). He also said that he exrunined 
for tire marks in the defendant's left hand lane or the 
area where :Jlr. Bowman et al claimed to have seen tire 
marks of the Studebaker and explained that there were 
no such tire marks in that vicinity (R. 644-5). 
'Yhen ~Ir. Sherwood was asked to describe the tire 
marks leading along the shoulder and across the high-
way, l\lr. Schoenhals injected objections on the ground 
that the testimony would be repetitious and that the 
photographs spoke for themselves. Thereupon it was 
stipulated at the suggestion of the court that officer 
Sherwood would testify in regard to such tire marks and 
the physical evidence the same as officer White and 
Sheriff Robins on ( R. 640). 
PLAINTIF'F'S' THEORY 
Plaintiffs' theory was clearly demonstrated by a 
drawing, Exhibit "GG" prepared before trial showing a 
collision entirely on defendant's left or wrong side of 
the highway. Plaintiffs' Exhibits "BB" and "CC" were 
also used to illustrate the testimony of plaintiffs' wit-
nesses. For convenience we have reproduced these 
exhibits herein to illustrate the testimony. (Ex. 66-BB-
CC) 
As proof that the collision occurred in the east lane 
Appellants claimed there were north bound tire marks of 
the Studebaker in the east lane intersecting the tractor 
marks. To establish these marks they called Harry T. 
Bowman, a friend and former co-worker of Captain 
13 
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Xenakis who was killed in the accident (R. 315), and 
James A. Middleton and Harold and Grant Staples, 
who later went with Bowman to the scene. 
HARoLD T. BowMAN 
Harold T. BoWinan testified he went alone to the 
scene of the accident about 4:30 or 4:45 P. M. the day 
it occurred. He didn't ~-x;amine it thoroughly that day 
(R. 271, 274). He made two visits the following day, 
October 20th, and a fourth visit the day after, October 
21st. On the later visits he took Harold and Grant 
Staples and apparently :Mr. Middleton (R. 316, 332). 
On his visit the second day, October 20th, there had 
been traffic over the particular area. It wasn't the same 
(R. 276). On that day, the 20th, he examined them (R. 
285). He said there was a faint set of tire marks east of 
the center of the road (R. 286) which stopped just before 
they got to the cross marks of the tractor. 
"They just came to that point and there were no 
more marks" (R. 287). They just disappeared. He 
couldn't trace them any further (R. 313). He said these 
marks were tiwo feet east of the center of the highway 
(R. 296) and on Exhibit BB marked two blue lines to 
illustrate their location (R. 303). 
He observed another set of tire marks (identified by 
the investigating officers as the Studebaker mark~) 
approaching from the south and crossing the highway as 
shown in Exhibit F, which he marked in red on Exhibit 
BB. He said the first mentioned marks appeared wider 
than the others crossing the highway ( R. 290, 304). He 
didn't measure or use a tape and all measuremen b WPI'<' 
14 
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only approximations ( R. 316). He said he couldn't be 
accurate when he was "guessing" (R. 317). He had no 
personal knowledge that any of the marks were made 
by the Studebaker involved in the accident (R. 334). 
He identified three small parts of the Studebaker 
(Exhibits U, Y and \Y) which he said he found on the 
east shoulder (R. 294). 
On the day following the accident he also claimed 
to have observed some zig zag marks, about the approxi-
mate length of the tractor back frmn the so-called point 
of impact on the east side (R. 273, 279, 280, 282-3) where 
again he made no measurements but guessed (R. 300). 
He denied seeing any wavey or zig zag marks made 
by defendant's right front flat tire. 
JAMES A. MIDDLETON 
James A. Middleton, a student from the B. Y. U. at 
Provo, was deer hunting. He couldn't remember the day 
but believed it was October 21st (R. 340). He testified: 
"Well, Mr. Bowman and I walked out where 
we saw one track and it * * * looked like pretty 
old track." (R. 344) "He stood in the middle of 
the road and these lines, I imagine made by an 
automobile, were about two feet on that (east) 
side of the road." (R. 346) 
He made a similar drawing as Bowman, marked 
Exhibit CC, showing the alleged Studebaker marks on 
the east side and the other north bound tire marks (iden-
tified by the investigating officers as the Studebaker 
marks) crossing the highway which he marked 6 and 7 
on the same Exhibit (R. 346-7-8). 
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When asked by Mr. Schoenhals about zig zag marks 
from the tires of defendant's tractor, he said 
"It is quite hard to say because we were just 
walking out there." (R. 343) 
He had never discussed the matter with Mr. Bow-
man or Mr. Schoenhals, he had just met Schoenhals that 
day (R. 3'53). 
HAROLD STAPLES 
Harold Staples similarly testified to accompanying 
Mr. Bowman on October 20th seeing "some faint marks 
up in front of the truck" on the south or southeast side 
(R. 358). He acknowledged seeing another set that 
curved across the highway and undertook by way of 
estimate (R. 419) to say that the former were narrower 
than the latter ( R. 358-9-60) . 
GRANT STAPLES 
Grant Staples likewise went with Bowman the day 
after the accident. He did not make any measurements 
and his testimony was admittedly cumulative of Bow-
man's (R. 529). 
To bolster his theory counsel for Appellants. 
attempted to prove that the marks crossing the highway 
and proceeding across and through the debris were not 
caused by the Studebaker but by a Mercury that 
approached from the south and applied its brakes after 
the accident. Counsel had adroitly taken an· affidavit 
dated November 4, 1951 (about two weeks after the acci-
dent) from James Faile, written in his, counsel's, hand-
writing and later supplemented with two type'_Vritten 
affidavits both dated December 1::1, 1952 (all contained 
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in Exhibit 1-±). He even went further and attached 
affidavits of Faile bearing the san1e date, Decmnber 13th, 
to the photographs marked Exhibits "00" and "PP". 
These affidavits, five in all, were calculated to show that 
the Studebaker marks, as identified by the investigating 
officers, were those of the Mercury. 
Counsel for appellants did not call Faile as a wit-
ness nor use any of the affidavits or :B'aile's testimony as 
direct proof, but secretly concealed them as a surprise 
to impeach Faile. 
Faile's testimony and a court reporter's statement 
taken before Cecil Tucker in Ogden on January 22, 1952 
(see Exhibit 13) show that Faile was undoubtedly mis-. 
taken if not mislead with respect to the matter contained 
in the affidavits. 
On direct examination Faile testified that the Mer-
cury when it approached did not stop far enough north 
to get into the debris (R. 784). On cross examination by 
counsel for plaintiffs he acknowledged that he had signed 
the affidavits in Mr. Schoenhals' office in the presence 
of Schoenhals and Andreasen, where the typewritten 
forms had already been prepared (R. 792). He further 
testified that the morning of the accident he hadn't paid 
much attention to the marks and explained that he had 
previously identified the Mercury tire marks south of 
the accident as shown by the circle in Exhibit "H" (R. 
797-8). With reference to the court reporter's statement 
taken January 22nd, he had similarly shown that the 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
From the court reporter's statement (Exhibit 13) 
it was clear that Faile had no knowledge such as that 
contained in the affidavits. He was there questioned 
with respect to Erllibit "F" as follows: 
"Q. He is pointing to a mark across the 
highway, and a gentleman further back in the 
picture pointing to the line near the shoulder, did 
you examine the tire 1narks there~ 
"A. No I didn't. 
"Q. You wouldn't know whether they were 
caused by the Studebaker or not. 
"A. No I wouldn't know whether they were 
on it or not, I didn't pay attention to that. 
:j(: * * 
"Q. On exhibit F, I think you said about the 
tire marks there that you didn't scrutinize the 
highway close enough or examine that close 
enough to know what marks exactly were there. 
"A. No. The only ones I did pay any partie-· 
ular attention to is the one where the guy in the 
Mercury turned completely around in the road. 
"Q. Was that south of the place shown in 
exhibit F~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. There were other tire marks further 
down, a little ways~ 
"A. Yes, the one the Mercury made was fur-
ther south of these." 
RoY TALBOT 
Roy Talbot testified that when the Mercury ap-
proached he was standing 50 to 75 feet south of the 
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wreckage flagging traffic, that is south of the rear end 
of defendant's tractor and the debris (R. 806, 810). That 
the Mercury stopped about 15 to 20 feet south of him 
(R. 810), which would make a total distance of 65 to 90 
feet south of the accident that the Mercury stopped. 
Noyes testified that at that time he was standing 
right by the seats of the Studebaker keeping passing 
cars from coming too close to the bodies. The Mercury 
approached from the south (R. 742) and was traveling 
fast and applied its brakes. He further testified that it 
stopped a safe ·distance south of him. With reference to 
Exhibit "B" he pointed out that it stopped at a .place on 
the highway south of the passenger automobile shown 
in such exhibit and that the Mercury at no time came 
into or near the debris involved in the accident (R. 7 43). 
HoRACE CLARK 
Horace Clark testified he drove his 1951 Mercury 
north approaching the scene of the accident about 5 :30 
A. M. That he brought his Mercury to a stop on the 
right hand side short of defendant's truck. He did not 
drive into the debris (R. 811-813). 
BRAKES 
In bringing the matter of brakes before the court it 
appears that counsel for Appellants has greatly e~ag­
gerated this matter. 
Appellants' counsel was furnished with all of the 
service records of the tractor and trailer units and the 
only fault that he could find was that on September 24, 
1951 the right rear brake drum of the tractor was relined 
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and that the instructions in the book directed that both 
ends of the axle should be relined at the srune time. It 
must be remembered that on the tractor trailer unit 
there are sixteen wheels with brakes, four axles in all, 
and if there had been any uneven braking power in one 
axle it could only have a very minimal effect on the unit 
as a whole. 
It was shown through Theo Soden, defendant's shop 
foreman at Pocatello, that since publication of the serv-
ice record in question an improved make of cam hau 
come into operation so that irregardless of the amount 
of wear on any particular brake lining the amount of 
air pressure would be equal in each wheel (R. 766, 7, 8). 
With the use of the new cam on the unit it would be 
impossible for one of the wheels to lock (R. 769, 70). 
It also appears from the tractor service record and 
the testimony of Mr. Soden that all of the brakes were 
inspected and adjusted on October lOth and October 17th 
and were in good working order, the latter date being 
just two days before the accident (R. 770, 1). 
Mr. Soden, after observing the photographs, also 
explained that the tire marks made by the tractors and 
trailer were nonnal and did not indicate a bad brake 
condition (R. 771). He explained that the maximum 
braking efficiency occurs just before the wheels start 
to slide or burn rubber (R. 771), and that the tractor 
and trailer turning at the angle they did and on the 
slope in question would nor1nally throw its weight onto 
the right hand side which would force rotation of the 
right wheels for a longer period than the wheel~ on tJw 
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left hand side, which accounts for the darker Inarks on 
the left side as shown in the photographs ( R. 77'2). Under 
these circmustances the wheels on the right could be per-
forming just as Inuch braking function as the ones on 
the left (R. 772). 
Laren Somson testified that he used his brakes 
throughout the trip and that they were in good working 
order. 
Expert witnesses were used by both sides to demon-
strate the physical possibility of the collision as con-
tended for by each of the parties. The only dispute in 
issue, however, was which vehicle had turned onto its 
wrong side of the highway just prior to the impact. The 
foregoing summary of the evidence, therefore, should be 
sufficient to here illustrate the theory of the respective 
parties as defined at the pre-trial and pursued by each 
in the presentation of the evidence. 
The jury by its verdict unanimously found that the 
accident occurred as the eye witnesses said it did upon 
defendant's side of the highway. Appellants have not 
challenged the correctness of the finding and the judg-
ment, which is upheld by the great weight, if not all, of 
the evidence, but here seeks a reversal based upon twelve 
alleged assignments of error which we respectfully sub-
mit in no sense justify a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CLAIMED ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FAULTY 
BRAKES. 
As hereinabove shown by the pre-trial orde'r and 
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plaintiffs' theory as developed by the evidenee, it is 
clear that the ultimate issue for the jury was, which 
vehicle turned or was driven onto the wrong side causing 
the collision. Under either theory no collision would 
have occurred had not one or the other of the vehicles 
been driven across the high\\ray. Certainly neither plain-
tiffs nor defendant at the pre-trial made any claim that 
the collision would have occurred had not the other 
vehicle been driven across. Counsel for Appellants even 
went further and effectively acknowledged that there 
was no emergency which caused the Studebaker to swern, 
across the highway, as his theory was that the accident 
was not caused in that manner. 
We direct the court's attention to the fact that the 
Inatter of brakes was specifically brought up and dis-
cussed at the pre-trial and counsel for Appellants 
acknowledged that that matter went only to the ultimate 
question of who got on the wrong side. 
"The Court: That only goes to the wrong 
side. 
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes." 
Special verdicts were prepared by the court and on 
the morning of the second day of the trial, at a confer-
ence in the Judge's chambers, it was specifically agreed 
"That a special verdict may be used here to 
determine whether or not there is liabilitY, and 
that no evidence of damages will be offered. to the 
jury until they first determine the question of 
whether or not there is liability.'' (R. 361) 
In submitting the ultimate question to the jury the 
court did not limit either party in thPir rP~Jl<'di,·p 
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theories as to why one or either of the vehicles got onto 
the wrong side just prior to the collision. Plaintiffs were 
not limited in presenting evidence and arguing their 
theory to the jury. In fact, counsel was given great lee-
way in that regard and in particular as to the claimed 
matter of brakes. 
Plaintiffs' theory that defendant's truck may have 
been driven or veered to the left on account of faulty 
brakes was no nwre an ultimate issue than the tre-
mendous speed of plaintiffs' Studebaker automobile as 
it entered the curve, getting onto the loose gravel and 
then careening across the highway. Defendant's re-
quested instruction in this connection (R. 215) was not 
given as the agreed procedure and purpose of the special 
verdict was to limit the issue to the ultimate and deter-
mining fact. The procedure folld'wed by the court to 
obtain a finding on the ultimate issue operated so as to 
confine both parties to such issue, but neither was limited 
in showing any reasons or grounds for their claim that 
the other vehicle negligently crossed the highway just 
hefore the collision. 
Plaintiffs made 35 requested instructions, including 
lA, lB, 15A, 16A and 21 A, many of which were not 
proper statements of the law. Be that as it may, there 
was no need for the court to give the requested instruc-
tions of either party when there was one agreed ultimate 
Issue. 
The court did give appropriate instructions as 
would enable the jury to make findings upon the issue 
submitted to the1n (R. 87). Included among the instruc-
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tions were the usual instructions upon preponderance of 
evidence, pro.ximate cause, credibility of the witness, etc. 
Also included among the instructions were the following: 
"No. 4 
"You are instructed that it was unlawful for 
either the driver of the Studebaker automobile 
or the driver of the Garrett truck to drive his 
vehicle to the left of the center of the highway 
upon which he was traveling unless he drove 
across the center of the big highway for the pur-
pose of avoiding an accident; and if either driver 
drove to the left of the center of the highway at 
a time when it was not necessary to do so to avoid 
an accident, he would be negligent as a matter of 
law." (R. 88) 
"No. 4 
"Negligen~e is defined as the failure to do 
that which an ordinarily reasonable prudent per-
son would have done under the same or similar 
circumstances, or it is the doing of that which an 
ordinarily prudent person would not have done 
under the given circumstances of the case. The 
fault may lie in acting or in failing to act, and 
the duty to act or not to act is measured by the 
exigencies of the occasion." (R. 89) 
The jury unanimously found that the plaintiffs' and 
Appellants' vehicle, the Studebaker automobile, was 
negligently driven across the center of the highway. 
They did not find that the defendant's vehicle was driven 
across the highway. Their failure to find that the defend-
ant's vehicle was driven across the center of the high-
way must be construed against the Appellants, since 
they had the burden of proof, and, therefore, it is an 
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express finding that the defendant's vehicle was not 
driven ac.ross the center of the highway. There is abund-
ant evidence in the record to sustain the jury's finding. 
"It is a rule of general application that it is 
not the province of the appellate court to weigh 
the evidence where it is conflicting. The rule, as 
1nore broadly stated in most jurisdictions, is that 
the verdict or findings of the jury rendered on 
the trial of a case will not be disturbed by a 
reviewing court where the evidence is conflicting 
and the case has been fairly submitted to the jury 
under proper instructions;* * *" 5 C.J.S. 671 
Special verdicts are authorized by Rule 49-A, Utah Rules 
Of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 195·3, which 
provides: 
"(a) SPECIAL VERDICTS. The court may 
require a jury to return only a special verdict in 
the form of a .special written finding upon each 
issue of fact. In that event the court may submit 
to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit 
written forms of the several special findings 
which might properly be made under the plead-
ings and evidence; or it may use such other method 
of submitting the issues and requiring the written 
findings thereon as it deems most appropriate~ 
The eourt shall give to the jury such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus sub-
mitted as n1ay be necessary to enable the jury 
to make its findings upon each issue. If in so 
doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by 
the pleadings or by the evidence, each party 
waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so 
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands 
its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted 
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1 ] 
without such demand the court may 1nake a find. ' 
ing; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to 
have made a finding in accord with the judgment 
on the special verdict." 
A special verdict is distinguished from a general 
verdict in Smith v. Ireland, 4 Utah 187, 7 Pac. 749 as 
follows: 
"A general verdict is a direct statement of a 
conclusion of law, and is an indirect statement of 
the facts from which the conclusion is drawn; it 
expressly affirms the law and inferentially the 
facts. The jury are directed by the court to indi- 1 I 
cate the facts found from the evidence by the 
statement of a conclusion of law. If they beliece 
certain facts, they are told to state certain conclu-
sion, a,nd if they do not believe such facts, to state 
another conclusion. 
"The court states the law applicable to the 
facts which the evidence tends to prove, and if the 
jury finds the facts they state the conclusions as 
charged. In the case of a general verdict, the 
court states the law applicable to the facts before 
they are found by the jury, and in a special cer-
dict the court declares the law applicable to them 
afterwards. In either case, the jury is judge of 
the facts and the court of the law." 
Thus, it is seen that in a general verdict the court 
instructs the jury on the law applicable to various factual 
situations which the jury ma~y find and the jury actually 
applies the law to the facts, as the law has been defined 
by the court's instructions, and come up with a verdict 
which is actually a conclusion of law. In such an instance, 
it is of course proper to instruct the jury a~ to the lnw 
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which may be applicable to whatever ultimate facts they 
may find under the evidence of the case. 
However, a special verdict only requires the jury to 
find the ultimate facts and the court, rather than the 
jury, applies the law to the facts. There is, therefore, 
no necessity for the jury to be instructed upon the law 
applicable to all the various aspects of the case. They 
only need such instructions as will enable them to deter-
mine the ultimate facts. 
Moreover, the form of the special verdict should be 
concise and should not relate to evidentiary facts. 
"Evidential Facts. Questions to the jury 
should relate to the ultimate facts, and not merely 
to the evidence on which such ultimate facts rest. 
The purpose of having the jury find specially on 
a particular question is to ascertain the fact itself, 
and not merely the evidence which may tend to 
prove it, hence, parties to an action have no right, 
under the guise of submitting questions of fact 
to be found specially by the jury, to require them 
to give their views on each item of evidence, thus 
practically subjecting them to a cross-examination 
as to the en tire case." 53 A1n. J ur. 7 43 
We have in this case two automobiles approaching 
each other on a two-lane highway from opposite direc-
tions. There can be no ultimate factor which caused the 
collision of those two vehicles except that one or the 
other or both drove onto the wrong side of the road. 
Although there may have been a number of reasons why 
one or the other or both would drive on the wrong side 
of the road, which might or might not have been negli-
gent, they, in themselves, could not be the proximate 
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cause of the accident and, therefore, are not the ultimate 
fact on which liability, if any, must rest. For example, 
one of the drivers may have failed to keep a proper 
lookout, traveled too fast, failed to keep proper control 
or driven a vehicle with faulty brakes. Any of the actions 
may be negligent but could not, in themselves, cause this 
accident. They are only evidence tending to prove the 
ultimate issue, that one or the other negligently drove 
over the center line onto the wrong side of the road. 
Appellants were not precluded from introducing evidence 
on the speed of defendant's vehicle, lookout or faulty 
brakes; nor were they precluded from using this evidence 
in their argument to the jury. The jury, however, were 
only concerned with this evidence in its probative value 
as to whether defendant's vehicle was negligently driven 
onto the wrong side of the highway. 
The jury was advised by instruction No. 4 that it 
was negligence, under the evidence in this case, for either 
driver to drive his car over the center line, regardless of 
the reason, faulty brakes or o-therwise, with the one 
e-xception that the driver drove onto the wrong side to 
avoid an accident. This instruction was sufficiently 
broad to cover the theory of the plaintiffs' case and to 
enable the jury intelligently to decide the ultimate issue 
of fact put to them. It was even more favorable to plain-
tiffs than was claimed by them at the pre-trial where it 
was acknowledged that there was no emergency which 
caused the Studebaker to swing out of control and across 
the highway. 
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submitted to the jury to the extent that it is supported 
by evidence and pleading in the case. rrhis does not 
mean that the court n1ust give the exact instructions 
requested by a party if the theory is covered in ~sub­
stance by the other instructions. The instructions 
requested by Appellants in the form requested would 
have confused rather than ruded the jury. The jury n1ay 
have believed that the brakes on defendant's vehicle 
were repaired in a faulty manner and yet, found that 
defendant did not drive to the wrong side of the highway 
prior to the impact. Under the instructions requested, 
a finding of faulty brakes might be understood to compel 
a finding that defendant's vehicle was driven to the wrong 
side of the highway, a conclusion which does not neces-
sarily follow. 
The jury by their unanimous finding that the defend-
ant's truck was not driven to the wrong side of the high-
way and that the Studebaker was, determined the ulti-
mate issue agreed at the pre-trial. It was the province 
of the jury to determine the ultimate issue, as was their 
reasons or grounds for so finding. 
'Thus it is seen that the court adequately instructed 
the jury for them to answer the interrogatories put to 
them and was not guilty of prejudicial error by reason 
of his not giving the instructions requested ~y both 
parties as to why or what reason it was claimed the other 
vehicle crossed the highway. 
CRoss ExAMINATION OF SHERIFF CuLBERT RoBINSON 
Counsel for Appellants complains of the ruling of 
the court relative to his cross examination of Sheriff 
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Robinson. On page 617 of the Record Mr. Schoenhals, 
while cross examining the Sheriff who investigated the 
accident, asked this question: 
"Q. Sheriff: Are you familiar with the fact 
_ that there is a State law requiring that all 
brakes ... " 
The court ruled: 
"The Court: Well, now, let me tell the jury 
what the law is, and let's not be telling them uy 
inference here. If we need any law told to the 
jury, I will explain that to then1 so you don't h:_l Ye 
to bother the sheriff about it." 
The court's ruling was proper :since it is the duty of 
the court in a trial of an action to instruct the jury on 
what the law is. Counsel should not attempt to instruct 
them by his examination of witnesses. 
CRoss ExAMINATION OF THEO SoDEN 
On page 10 of his Brief, counsel for Appellants 
complains of the court's ruling with regard to cross 
examination of the witness r~rheo Soden. On page 775 of 
the Record counsel asks the question: 
"Q. and, therefore, isn't it true that if you 
put a newer lining in that you are apt to get le:;;t-i 
friction area on a newer lining than you are on 
the older lining-~" 
Just previous to that question, counsel had asked the 
same witness: 
"Q. You wouldn't know. Isn't it also pos-
sible that when you place in a new lining, that 
the new lining if looked at under a microscope has 
like mountains and valleys in it and the area of 
friction of the new lining might be much less than 
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the area of friction on the new lining. Isn't that 
the situation~ 
··A. Yes, that would be true." 
The court instructed the witness that the second 
question was repetitious and that he need not answer 
the same. A reading of the two questions will show that 
the second question was repetitious and that, therefore, 
the court's ruling was correct. 
II. CLAIMED ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION 
NO.4. 
Appellants contend that the court's instruction No. 
4, hereafter quoted, was erroneous in that the words 
"drive his vehicle to the left of the center of the highway" 
were not broad enough to include the movement of the 
vehicle to the wrong side of the highway by reason of 
faulty brakes. This assignment is essentially a re-argu-
ment of the matter under point No. I. 
"Instruction No. 4 
"You are instructed that it was unlawful for, 
either the driver of the Studebaker automobile or 
the driver of the Garrett truck to drive his vehicle 
to the left of the center of the highway upon which 
he was traveling unless he drove across the center 
of the highway for the purpose of avoiding an 
accident; and if either driver drove to the left 
of the center of the highway at a time when it was 
not necessary to do so to avoid an accident, he 
would be negligent as a matter of law." (R. 88, 
Vol. 2) 
The court's instruction applied equally to each party 
and fairly stated the issue. To specify reasons why 
either driver drove to the left amount to a comment on 
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the evidence and tend to invade the province of the jury. 
Furthermore, counsel for Appellants would undoubtedly 
have then claimed that the court, by the instruction, 
unduly limited him to brakes as the sole reason why 
defendant crossed the highway, if he did so cross. 
Respondent might just as well argue that the court 
should have supplemented the instruction by comment-
ing on the unlawful and excessive speed, failure of proper 
lookout and loss of control, etc. on the part of the opera-
tor of the Studebaker automobile. The instruction as 
given was fair; in fact even favorable to Appellants in 
that Appellants had acknowledged that there was no 
emergency which caused the driver of the Studebaker 
to veer onto the wrong side. The instruction given did 
not suggest to the jury why either vehicle was driven 
onto the wrong side, but wisely left the issue to the jury. 
Appellants' objections to the instructions of the 
court made at the time of the trial are to be found on 
page 853, line 24 and 854 of the Record. Now here in therir 
objections is there any objection taken to the wordin.g of 
the court's mstruction No. 4. 
It is axiomatic that in order for one to complain 
of an instruction he must do so at the time of trial and 
give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error. 
"No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto. In objecting to this case giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the mat-
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Moreover, the in8truction as given by the court was 
sufficiently broad to cover the situation should the jury 
have believed frmn the evidence that the defendant's 
truck was propelled across a highway by the application 
of faulty brakes, was turned in that direction, or for 
some other reason crossed over on the wrong side of the 
highway. In the sense used in the instruction, "drive" is 
defined by \\T ebster to mean: 
"To urge on and direct the motions of, as 
horse, hence, also to convey in a vehicle" (Web-
sters Collegiate Dictionary 3rd Ed.) 
The phrase, "drive his vehicle to the left of the 
center of the highway" conotes a number of actions to 
persons of ordinary experience and intelligence. It con-
notes the direction and control of an automobile by the 
application of power through an accelerator, the control 
of that power by the shifting of gears, the stopping of 
the vehicle by the application of brakes, the turning of 
an automobile by the steering wheel. Actually the term 
"drive" implies to the ordinary individual all the actions 
which are necessary to direct and control an automobile 
in its course upon a highway. It may imply the absence 
of such control and direction when used in such terms 
as reckless driving and driving too fast for existing 
conditions. 
In construing instructions, we must not put a super 
technical construction upon the words used, but they 
must be construed liberally and in this sense they would 
be understood by the jury. 
"Instructions should not be subjected to a 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
critical analysis, such as is applied in construing 
pleadings, statutes, or even contracts. On the 
contrary, when reviewed, they. shoul~ be ac~orded 
fair and reasonable constructwn, w1th a v1ew to 
-ascertaining the meaning probably placed upon 
them by the jury. It is ele1nentary that an instnlC-
tion should be interpreted in the light of the evi-
dence and theories presented by the re8pective 
parties and that several instructions are to be consid~red together as constituting the single 
charge of the court. The words employed should 
be accorded their natural and accepted meaning, 
and even though an instruction is not in the 
language approved by usuage, it will be held 
sufficient if couched in terms plainly conveying 
the same meaning." 2 Bancrofts Code Practice 
And Remedies 1990. 
The jury had listened to evidence for four days, 
expert and otherwise, all of which was directed toward 
proving which vehicle was on the wrong side of the high-
way at the time of impact. Appellants had thoroughly 
explored their theory, that the defendant's vehicle was 
pr:opelled across the highway by the application of faulty 
brakes. Both in the examination of witnesses and in 
argument they were allowed great leeway even to the 
extent of demonstrating how they claimed the collision 
occurred. The jury had the issue, the theories and the 
evidence well in mind and natural1~, would interpret the 
instruction given in light of them. 
In view of the evidence and the plain meaning of 
the word "drive", there can be no question that the 
instruction given by the court was understood hy the 
jury to cover a situation (if the jur~, had chosen to believe 
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the evidence to that effect) where the driver of defend-
ant's vehicle drove his vehicle onto the wrong side of the 
road, whether by an application of faulty brakes or other-
wise. Their answer in the defendant's favor must be 
construed as a finding that the defendant's vehicle did 
not pass onto the wrong side of the road prior to the 
impact between the two vehicles. 
III. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GIVE INSTRUC-
TIONS 1-B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 26 and 27. 
Consistent with the theory of the case as claimed 
by both parties, we have pointed out why it was not nec-
essary for the trial court to give the· requested instruc-
tions of either party as the matter was fairly resolved 
in the form of special verdicts. Counsel for Appellants' 
argument under this topic seems calculated to over-
emphasize the matter of brakes when it was no more 
related to the ultimate issue than the terrific speed, 
loss of control and reckless conduct on the part of the 
operator of the Studebaker. Appellants were no more 
limited than was Respondent. 
Appellants were in no manner limited in their evi-
dence or argument to the jury. The Record shows 
counsel for Respondents was given great latitude in 
showing the brake condition and in illustrating and 
demonstrating to the jury, to the extent that if any com-
plaint is due the complaint should justifiably be made 
by defendant in permitting undue repetition. Certainly 
the statements asserted by counsel for Appellant as to 
such matters are wholly without foundation. 
A review of the Record ( R. 853-854) will show that 
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Appellants made no objections at the time of trial to the 
court's failure to give requested instructions 4, 5, 6, 8, 
11, 16, 17, 26 and 27. No reasons were assigned why arvy 
of the requested instructions should have been given, 
and for reasons heretofore mentioned they cannot now 
be heard to complain at this tirne. Furthern1ore, counsel 
for Appellants' argument here is most certainly contrary 
to his statement to the trial court at the time of pre-trial 
that the matter of brakes, etc. only went to the ultimate 
issue of why either driver drove to the wrong side. 
It further appears that counsel for Appellants 
entirely overlooks the fundamental difference between a 
trial where all issues are resolved in the forn1 of a general 
verdict and a case tried by special verdicts under the 
new rules, particularly where the matter of special ver-
dict is determined at pre-trial and by agreement in open 
court. Where there is a general verdict, as we have here-
tofore pointed out, the jury is required to resolve all 
issues and both find the facts and apply the law. When 
a special verdict is submitted the law is applied' by the 
court to the facts as found by the jury. 
In the case here before the court the jury's finding 
that the defendant did not negligently drive its truck 
onto the wrong side of the highway, that is that the 
defendant was not negligent, rnade any further inquir.,· 
into the evidentiary facts or any further application of 
law unnecessary, except by entry of appropriate jud:~­
ment by act of the court. In any event in this case the 
rules of law to be applied would be applied by the court 
based on the ultimate facts as found hy the jury, and 
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there is no reason why the jury should be instructed on 
law they were not oxpected to apply. 
Appellants' complaint at page 14 of the court's 
refusal to give requested instructions No. 26 and 27 
(R. 202-3) is inconsistent with the theory of either party. 
In the first instance, no exceptions whatsoever were 
taken to the refusal of the court to give plaintiffs' 
reque8tion instructions No. 26 and 27 (seeR. 854). Plain-
tiffs at the trial did not make any claim that both units 
were riding the center line, and certainly the giving of 
instructions in that regard would have been erroneous 
under the evidence produced and contrary to the theory 
of either party as determined at the pre-trial. The 
theory of both parties and all the evidence presented was 
to the effect that the impact occurred clearly on one side 
of the road or the other, and not in the center or near the 
center of the road, and that one or the other of the par-
ties was entirely to blame, but not both. The evidence 
showed that the right front side of defendant's vehicle 
collided with the left front fender of the plaintiffs' 
vehicle. This being the case, one of the vehicles would 
have to be clearly on the wrong side of theroad at the 
time the two vehicles met. Had both of the vehicles been 
riding the center of the highway, the point of impact 
between the two vehicles would have been toward the 
left side of each vehicle. 
Furthermore the tire marks, as evidenced by both 
parties, especially in the light of the testimony of the 
eye witnesses, necessarily showed that the impact 
occurred near the defendant's right hand shoulder or 
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I 
where Bowman et al placed the alleged Studebaker marks l 
entirely on the east side or in plaintiffs' proper lane of 
traffic. 
Let us suppose that the jury had been instructed 
that the brakes should be adjusted equally and that the 
jury found that the defendant's were not so adjusted; 
or that they had been instructed on keeping a reasonable 
lookout and found that the defendant did not keep a 
proper lookout; or that they had been instructed on 
reasonable speed and found that the defendant 'n:s drj\·-
ing unreasonably fast. None of these findings would 
compel or even direct a verdict for the plaintiffs in this 
action. None of these actions could have been the ulti-
mate proximate cause of the accident under the evidence 
and the theory of both parties. They are merely evi-
dentiary in nature and, if true, would tend to show at 
1nost that the defendant did, in fact, drive over to the 
wrong side of the highway which was the ultimate fact 
to be decided by the jury. 
IV. REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT 
GRANT STAPLES TO TESTIFY. 
The Record beginning on page 526 will show that 
the plaintiffs called Grant Staples to testify on behalf 
of the Appellants. At that point, the Appellants had 
introduced about 21 pictures and 7 different diagrams, 
picturing the various marks on the highway at the scene 
of the accident and the damage to the two vehicles. He 
had also covered the marks on the highway in great 
detail by four witnesses, Harry T. Bowman, .James A. 
Middleton, Harold Staples and Franklin Rtuart Harris, 
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Jr. After Appellants' counsel had shown that Grant 
Staples had visited the area on the 20th of October, the 
day after the accident in question, the court asked Appel-
lants' counsel : 
"The Court: Is this testimony just going to 
be cumulative of what Mr. Bowman and Mr. Har-
old Staples have testified to? 
"Thfr. Schoenhals: I am going to have him 
draw a map of what he saw on the road. 
"The Court: We have got so many maps, we 
will never find them. Is it only going to be cumu-
lative of what these other men have testified tof 
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes. 
"The Court: Let's not have that." (R. 528) 
The Appellants then attempted to go into a descrip-
tion of the various marks on the highway and was per-
mitted to do so to the point that it appeared that this 
witness would not testify to anything which had not 
already been testified to by previous witnesses. 
There must be an end to an inquiry at some point. 
When it appears that previous witnesses have given the 
sa1ne evidence and that a witness's testimony is merely 
cumulative of what prior witnesses have testified, the 
trial judge, in his discretion, may exclude further testi-
mony. 
"There seems to be no doubt as to the right 
of a trial court, in the exercise of a sound and 
reasonable judicial discretion, to limit the number 
of witnesses that may be sworn by either party to 
a controversy covering a certain fact in issue. The 
trial court has power to direct the course of the 
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trial and as one of the necessary incidents of that 
' . power it may limit the nun1ber of Witnesses as to 
a certain point, when, in its opinion, further testi-
mony on the point would be n1erely cumulative 
and of no assistance to the jury." (21 A. L. R. 335. 
See also 48 A. L. R. 947; Skeen v. Mooney, 8 Utah 
157, 30 Pac. 363) 
There is no question that the testimony of Grant 
Staples was 1nerely cumulative of what had already been 
covered in great detail by the exhibits and other wit-
nesses. It was well within the discretionary power of the 
trial court to exclude further evidence and the refusal 
to permit Grant Staples to duplicate the testimony was 
not error. It was similar to the court's suggestion to 
which Respondent agreed that the testimony of Utah 
Highway Patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood would be cumu-
lative as to the sa1ne marks and measurements as the 
other investigating officers which they made the morn-
ing of the accident. 
V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING QUES-
TIONS TO THE WITNESS HARRIS, AS TO HIS OPINIONS, 
TO BE SUBMITTED IN THE FORM OF HYPOTHETICAL 
QUESTIONS. 
We cannot agree with Appellants' statement and 
conclusions nor the record as they have represented it 
to this court. 
An examination of the Record (R. 337-526) will 
reveal that Dr. F·ranklin S. Harris was permitted to 
answer direct questions on those material and relevant 
facts which were within his own knowledge. He was 
permitted to testify as to the tests he made, the observa-
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tions he Inade, n1easure1nents and marks that he found on 
the highway; hmvever, the court did require that in que8-
tions asked of him as to his opinion in regard to the 
movements followed by the vehicles before and after the 
impact the factors upon which he was basing his opinion 
be set out either by n1eans of hypothetical questions or 
otherwise. 
The witness Harris was asked as an expert pre-
sumably to assist the jury in a scientific analysis of the 
evidence. As an ffiq)ert, his testimony, of course, would 
only be of value to the jury in those matters which were 
beyond their own knowledge and experience or, as other-
Wise stated, were not a matter of common knowledge. 
"Expert opinion testimony, while not limited 
or restricted in its scope to matters of science, art, 
or skill, is not allowed to invade the field of com-
mon knowledge. Such testimony cannot be received 
either to prove or to disprove those things which 
are supposed to lie within the common knowledge, 
experience, and education of n1en. It is inadmis-
sible where the matter under consideration is of 
such a character that anyone of ordinary intel-
ligence, without any peculiar habits or course of 
study, would be able to form a correct opinion. 
If the subject is one of common knowledge, as to 
which the facts can be intelligently described to 
the jury and understood by them and they can 
form a reasonable opinion for themselves, the 
opinion of an expert will be rejected. The mere 
fact that a witness may know 1nore concerning 
the subject of inquiry and may better comprehend 
it than the jury does not qualify him as an expert 
whose opinion testimony may be given, unless the 
subject of inquiry relates to some trade, profes-
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sion, science, or art in which persons instructed 
therein by study or experience may be supposed 
to have more skill and knowledge than jurors of 
average intelligence. Unless the subject of inquiry 
does relate to smne trade, profession, science, or 
art, it is within the province of the jury to form 
their own opinion, and not of witnesses, although 
experts, to express theirs. It is possible that the 
jurors may have less skill and sxperience than 
the witnesses and yet be able to draw their own 
conclusions. Expert testimony is not available 
for the purpose of giving a word of common mean-
ing a technical significance." (20 Am. Jur. 651) 
Moreover, the expert should not be allowed to invad~ 
the province of the jury. That is, where an opinion is 
based on facts on which there is a conflict of evidence, 
it should be clear to the jury that the weight of the 
opinion depends on what facts the jury may find to be 
true. 
"Every expert opinion rests upon an assump-
tion of fact; if the opinion is given upon a hypo-
thetical question, its weight depends wholly on the 
jury finding that the assumed facts have been 
proved; if it is based on the expert's own testi-
mony as to the facts, the truth of this testimony is 
no less open to their belief or disbelief; and, in 
addition, the soundness of the opinion itself is 
to be determined by the jury in consideration of 
its apparent reasonableness or their confidence 
in the skill and trustworthiness of the witness, and 
of any contradiction from any other expert~." 
(20 Am. Jur. 654) 
It is, therefore, important that the jury know the 
facts or basis on which the expert predicates his opinion: 
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otherwise, the opinion is rneaningless to them for they 
have no way of determining when the opinion may come 
into play. 
"Opinion testimony of an e.xpert witness rnay 
be based upon facts within his own knowledge 
which he details to the jury before giving his 
opinion or upon hypothetical questions embracing 
facts supported by the evidence and relating to the 
particular matter upon which the expert's opinion 
is sought, which facts, for the purpose of the 
opinion, are assumed to be true." (20 Am. Jur. 
661) 
In the case of conflicting testimony, the questions 
must necessarily be formed in the form of hypothetical 
questions. To permit otherwise will allow the expert to 
invade the province of the jury and resolve conflicts in: 
testimony which should be resolved by the jury. 
"All courts agree that if there is any conflict 
between the witnesses as to facts on which an 
expert opinion is sought, the expert witness can-
not, although he has heard the testimony, be 
asked to base his opinion on that testimony, 
because, to reach his conclusion, he must neces-
sarily invade the province of the jury and pass 
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 
the evidence. In cases of conflict in the testimony 
heard by experts, a hypothetical statement of facts 
upon which their opinion is sought is required. 
It is generally agreed also that if the facts testi-
fied to by other witnesses are doubtful and remain 
to be found by the jury, it is improper to ask an 
expert who has heard the evidence for his opinion 
based upon such evidence. Also where the matter 
of allowing the expert to testify on the evidence 
is left to the discretion of the trial court, it is 
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held improper to incorporate testimony bodily in 
a complicated question." (20 Am. Jur. 664) 
As was held in the case of Diaz et al v~ Iwdustrial 
Commission of Utah, 80 Utah 77, 13 Pac. (2d) 307, an-
swers to hypothetical questions not founded upon, but 
contrary to, the established facts in the case can have no 
provative value. 
1\tloreover, an expert witness may not be permitted 
to assume facts when there is no evidence of such facts 
in the Record. In the case of Braddock v. Pacific Wood-
men Life .Ass'n., 89 Utah 75, 54 Pac. (2d) 1189, in which 
the issue before the court was the cause of the person's 
death, the hypothetical question asked of an expert wit-
ness, a doctor, was based on the assumption that the de-
ceased had appeared to be strong and healthy during the 
months and for many years prior to the time he received 
a certain injury. The undisputed testimony was that he 
had had an attack of flu and other disturbances during 
that period of time. The hypothetical question assumed 
that there was an infection in the toe which had been in-
jured and a fractured hip, of which there is no evidence. 
The trial court overruled an objection and permitted tlw 
doctor to state his opinion. The court said: 
"The objection should have been sustained. 
(Citation given) Relevant matters in evidence re-
specting the deceased's visits to doctors, an attack 
of the flu, his hyperacidity of the stomach, hi::-: 
myocardiac condition, and the prescribing of digi-
talis for it, were entirely omitted from the quP~­
tion, while the witness was asked to assume tlu• 
applicant was in good health, the very matter in 
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controver~y, prior to his final illness. The doctor 
was also permitted to assume there was infectjon 
in the toe injury, and that the assured suffered a 
fractured hip of which there was no evidence. 
• • * 'Vhile it is permissible that a hypothetical 
question be predicated on a statement of facts 
detailed by witnesses for one of the parties ( cita-
tion), the question here omitted undisputed facts 
and included others not supported by evidence. 
Obviously, the question was improper and mis-
leading." 
Let us now examine some of the rulings of the court 
which the Appellants claim were erroneous. On page 437 
of the Record, all the court did after the Appellants' 
counsel had been leading the witness for some time was 
to caution counsel as follows: 
"The Court: Let me ask you not to lead this 
witness. You only let your witness say 'Yes' and 
you take a half an hour giving your question. Let 
the witness tell what he did, and we will get 
through quicker." 
On page 440 of the Record, the witness volunteered 
the information that a pin on the truck was in such a 
position that it made the mark which was found upon the 
Studebaker. Upon a motion to strike, the court ruled: 
"The Court: I think that that might go out 
and the jury told to disregard it. He could give 
the height of the pin as compared to other mat-
ters." 
There can be no question but that the answer invaded 
the province of the jury, whose duty it was to determine 
what made the marks on the Studebaker. 
All the, way through the questioning of this witness, 
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counsel for the Appellants would ask his questions in a 
manner which merely required the witness to answer 
"Yes." On page 444, after four such questions, the court 
said: 
"'The Court: Mr. Schoenhals, you are lead-
ing this man. I am going to have to stop it. You 
have an expert down here who has something to 
tell the jury, and the only thing you let him say 
is 'Yes'. That is not proper. I have been overrul-
ing counsel so much I guess he has just given up 
making his objections, but I am fast going to in-
sist that you let this witness tell his story and not 
lead him." 
On page 446 of the Record, counsel for the Appel-
lants asked the expert Harris : 
"Doctor, calling your attention to Exhibit B, 
and particularly to the two marks in the red 
square between X2 and X, if you-do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not the two units C· nn-
ing together where the tractor and trailer was 
moving at a speed of between thirty-seven and 
thirty-nine miles per hour and where the Stude-
baker involved was traveling at a similar rate of 
speed, as to whether or not the impact at the angle 
you assume existed would or would not make any 
movement with respect to the rear duals of th:• 
tractor sufficient to make a noticeable mark on 
the highway~" 
The question presumed that the Studebaker automo-
bile was traveling at the same rate of speed as the trac-
tor-trailer-37-39 miles an hour, (all of the evidence was 
that it was traveling about 80 miles per hour) and as-
sumed an impact at a certain angle. There was no evi-
dence in the Record that the Studebaker automobile was 
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going 37 miles per hou... v:r that the point of impact was 
where the question assuu1ed it to be. Moreover, the doc-
tor was not asked to make any conclusion, but the ques-
tion was put to determine if the very factors to be as-
sumed were already established. The court recessed be-
fore ruling was had on the objection to the question and 
apparently counsel abandoned the question and the rul-
ing was neYer forthcoming (R. 447). 
On page ±55 of the Record, the witness was asked to 
tell the jury what he observed with regard to skid marks. 
The court instructed counsel that the witness had been 
brought down to court as an expert and that, as an ex-
pert, he had to assume certain things to be true. That if 
counsel intended to use him merely as a lay witness his 
testimony would be merely cumulative of what the court 
already had and that he should be used as an expert on 
assumed facts. 
On page 459 the doctor was asked to assume the rear 
dual wheels were in a certain position and that the trac-
tor was 25 feet long. The doctor was then asked if this 
were true, where would the front end of the tractor be. 
Of course, it is elementary that the front end of the trac-
tor would be 25 feet ahead of the rear dual wheels. The 
court ruled that that was merely a 1natter of sixth grade 
arithmetic and not a matter on which an expert's opinion 
was needed. 
On page 468 of the Record, the witness was asked to 
express his opinion as to the movement the Studebaker 
would take after the impact, if the Studebaker and trac-
:r: tor met at the angle the witness had indicated. The wit-
~ ness answered: 
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"A. If there were a collision between two 
cars of this type taking place on the right front 
fender of the tractor, left front fender of the 
Studebaker shown by the damage to the two re-
spective cars, fron1 the dan1ages to the two we 
can't say exactly what the contact angle is. \Ye 
know that these two collided first because this is 
where the damage-it is only on this side and the 
imprint of license plate on this fender and the 
scratch marks across here. Now, from the exami-
nation of these shown in the pictures which were 
discussed earlier indicate that this is the type of 
thing which would do that damage* * *." 
At that point the court stopped the doctor and asked 
him not to argue the facts, but rather to state his opin-
ion as to the movement the Studebaker would take and 
the witness was then allowed to state his opinion. 
On page 483 of the Record, the witness was asked to 
assume that the Studebaker was 100 feet from the trac-
tor when it cut across the highway and that it was going 
more than 30 miles an hour. There was no evidence in 
the Record at that point before the court that the Stude-
baker was 100 feet away from the tractor when the 
Studebaker cut across the highway. The objection was 
sustained. 
On page 884 of the Record, the doctor was asked to 
assume the impact occurred at the point indicated on 
Exhibit "GG" and assume that the Studebaker came to 
rest at the point shown on Exhibit "A" and as shown in 
&xhibit "E" and then asked, considering the relativr 
movement of the Studebaker and tractor if that would 
be consistent with the impact occurring at the point 
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where he found it to oecur in Exhibit "GG". 
The question was faulty in a nun1ber of respects. 
First of all, it as·sumes that the impact occurred at "GG" 
and asks if it did occurr at ''GG", if that would be con-
sistent with the i1npact occurring at "GG". Secondly, it 
was repetitious and the question was not put on the basis 
of any evidence, but rather is an assumption based on the 
assumption. 
On page 518 of the Record, on redirect examination, 
the witness was asked to step down from the witness chair 
and to show the jury the complete movement of the two 
units as they engaged each other. The witness had been 
asked substantially the same thing and covered the same 
point on direct examination. The evidence was objected, 
to on the grounds that it was repetitious. The court sus-
tained the objections on that ground and on the ground 
that it was also argumentative and that the court did not 
believe that it would be proper for the expert to demon-
strate his theory to the jury, that being a matter for 
counsel to do in his argument. The witness was then per-
mitted to give his measurements as to the movements 
of the automobile. 
On page 520 of the Record, the witness was asked, 
assuming that the marks on the rear of the truck were 
made do you have an opinion as to whether or not the 
Studeba b~r could have gone up in between the rear duals 
and made a particular mark~ The court sustained an 
objection to the question on the grounds that it did not 
understand what facts were being assumed by the doe-
tor and could not tell from the question whether or not it 
J'(~quired an expert's opinion. 
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It is rather difficult to pull questions out of the con-
text of the Record, together with a ruling on the par-
ticular question, and give the court a clear picture of the 
rules of evidence involved. In order to do that thorough-
ly, it would be necessary to set out the complete exam-
ination of the witness. A reading of the Record discloses 
that the questions asked of this witness in those instances 
where the court sustained an objection to them, were im-
properly framed. They did not state the facts to be as-
sumed, or assumed facts which were not in the evidenr(l. 
Many of the questions were leading. Others were not 
matters of e.xpert opinion or invaded the province of the 
jury, or were repetitious. The court, rather than exclud-
ing testimony that should have been admitted, on occa-
sions, allowed technically improper questions to be an-
swered in order to get the benefit of the expert's opinion 
before the jury, which Appellants were permitted to do 
in full and in great detail. 
VI. CLAIMED ERROR OF THE COURT IN DIRECTING 
THE TRIAL. 
(a) Statement with respect to reading part of 
Noyes' statement. 
An examination of the Record in which the state-
ment quoted by Appellants appears, will show that the 
ruling of the court was not erroneous and the statement 
was not only not prejudicial to the Appel1ants but actual-
ly in their favor. 
Starting on page 747 of the Record, the proceedings 
were as follows : 
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"Q. Showing you this statement here, this is 
your signature on this page, isn't it~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. It says, 'Just before the in1pact of the 
two vehicles, the truck driver made a sharp turn 
to the left.' Doesn't it say that there~ 
":Mr. Hanson: Go ahead and read the rest 
of it. 
"~Ir. Schoenhals: Just a minute. Your Honor 
I object to ~ir. Hanson-
"The Court: Yes. I think you ought not di-
rect counsel. 
"~Ir. Hanson: Well-
"Mr. Schoenhals: I think if he is going to-
"The Court: Just a minute. Let me tell 
him something. If Mr. Schoenhals isn't asking 
these questions to suit you, make your objection 
to me. 
"Mr. Hanson: If your Honor please, I object 
to counsel not reading the whole question, just 
reading part and stopping there. I could follow 
him read, and he read half and stopped. 
"The Court: Go ahead. He may answer. 
You may have him read the rest of it. 
"Q. Just before the impact of the two ve-
hicles, the truck driver made a sharp turn to the 
left. Is that correct¥ 
"A. That is correct, but the rest of the sen-
tence on there-
"Q. Don't be anxious to help him out. You 
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· "Mr. Hanson: Just a minute. I object to 
Mr. Schoenhals arguing with the witness. 
"The Court: The objection is overruled. Go 
ahead, Mr. Schoenhals; and I say this to you: If 
either of these lawyers reads you half of a ques-
tion, you might assume they are trying to deceive 
you. That should be lesson enough to you gentle-
men if you don't read all that question you will 
find out they are going to think you are a stinker." 
The remark complained of was made during a pro-
voked argument between counsel and was made for the 
purpose of bringing that argument to an end and getting 
on with the trial. As was said in Haslam v. Morrison, 
113 Utah 14, 190 Pac. (2d) 520 which involved a digres-
sion of a witness rather than counsel: 
"But we must keep in mind that judges need 
not sit as sphinxes on the bench, nor should they 
be mere un1pires. 'fhey should, to a certain ex-
tent, guide the course of the trial and when a wit-
ness is wandering or digressing, tactfully bring 
him back into line." 
As is seen, the remark was proper in the court's con-
duct of the proceeding. But, assuming that it was not, 
there is nothing prejudicial to the Appellants about the 
remark. It does not pass upon the merits of either part~·'s 
evidence, nor did it single out one counsel as against 
the other and hold him up to the ridicule, but the remark 
was addressed to both. 
In McClure v. Donovan (Cal.), 195 Pac. (2d) 901 
the court expressed a desire to have a certain w i tm•s::; 
testify whom the defendant did not call, even though the 
witness was present. The remarks of the rourt, to whi<'h 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s.~eption was taken, were made during an argu1nent as 
to whether or not the witness should be called. The com-
ment of court was held not to be prejudicial. 
In Seidenberg v. George (Cal.), 172 Pac. (2d) 891, 
such remarks as •• We are wasting a lot of time" made by 
the court in an effort to hasten the trial were held not 
to be prejudicial. 
In Palmer v. City of Long Beach (Cal)., 189 Pac. 
(2d) 62, the appellant, after resting, stated that he de-
sired to make a motion in chambers, to which the court 
replied, "Make the motion and I will rule." This remark 
was held not to be prejudicial. 
In Key et ux v. British American Oil Producing Co. 
(Okla.), 167 Pac. (2d) 657, where the trial judge criti-
cized counsel for examining a juror at length before ex-
ercising a preemptory challenge; and where on another 
occasion the trial judge said of appellant's counsel, "We 
are going to have to hold (named counsel) down or he 
will run away with the courthouse"; and where on an-
other occasion during appellant's examination of the 
witness, during which he was leading the witness, the 
court said, "I will have to swear you", the remarks were 
held not to be prejudicial. 
The court quoted the following from the Corpus 
Juris with approval: 
"Where counsel engaged in the trial of an ac-
tion is guilty of impropriety of misconduct, a 
proper admonition, censure or rebuke by.the pre-
siding judge, in the presence and hearing of the 
jury, is ordinarily not prejudicial, where not 
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couched in intemperate language, although it i8 
ordinarily preferable that any rebuke be admini-
stered in the jury's absence. The judge is justi-
fied in using to counsel language sufficiently 
pointed and emphatic to put an end to objection-
able conduct, and some warmth or asperity in 
interchanges between counsel and the court will 
not give ground for complaint, particularly in a 
hotly contested case." 64 C. J. 92, sec. 93. 
"Improprieties or irregularities in the con-
duct of a judge are fatal, however, only where 
there is such departure from proper and orderly 
method of disposing of the action that the sub-
stantial rights of a party are materially affected. 
The manner or emphasis or force of expression 
of a judge that cannot be reasonably interpreted 
to express a wrong opinion as to the law or facts, 
or to express an opinion of a fact which should be 
left wholly to the jury, cannot be assigned as 
error, so mere decisiveness or abruptness of man-
ner is not necessarily objectionable, nor is impa-
tience, discourtesy, or bad manners, provided the 
essentials of sound judicial conduct are not vio-
lated, and complaint cannot ordinarily be made 
of the tone of voice used by the judge, unless some 
actual error is committed." 64 C. J. 102, sec. 107 
Thus it is seen that the remarks of court were not 
in error and were not prejudicial to the appellant's case. 
(b) Refusal of the Court to permit Sheriff Cul-
bert Robinson to state his knowledge of state law. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs asked Sheriff Robinson to 
state whether or not he knew the State law required the 
brakes on a vehicle to be in equal adjustment. The court 
did not permit the sheriff to answer that question. Ap-
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pellants n1isconceive the basis of the court's ruling to 
be that the question is leading. Actually the objection 
is more fundmnental. It calls for a witness to inform the· 
court or the jury of what the law is. The rule of law in 
this instance \vas contained in a state statute of which 
the court takes judicial notice. It is the province of the 
court to instruct the jury as to the law and it is not 
proper for the counsel, either directly or through an e;xJ-
amination of witnesses, to instruct or tell the jury what 
the law is. 
"It may be laid down as a general rule that a 
witness is never permitted to give his opinion on 
a question of domestic law or in other matters 
which involve questions of law. This rule is ap-
plicable to both expert and non-expert witnesses. 
Testimony of expert witnesses is, in general, con-
fined to rna tters of fact, as distinguished frmn 
matters of law. Opinion testimony of expert law-
yers upon legal questions, other than that as to 
the law of another jurisdiction or that which 
amounts to a conclusion of a law, cannot be prop-
erly received in evidence, for the determination 
of ·such questions is exclusively within the prov-
ince of the court. A party cannot appeal to a jury 
to decide legal questions by giving in evidence the 
opinions of public officers." 20 Am. J ur. 672. 
See also Idaho Forwarding Company v. Firemen!s 
Fund Ins. Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 Pac. 826, where the witness 
was not permitted to testify "how long the insurance 
was to be", where the same was specifically covered by 
the written policy of insurance which was in evidence. 
See also North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. 
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company, 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 
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168, where it was held error to allow a witness to explain 
the purposes of a canal company and the powers of the 
corporation when the same were outlined in the Articles 
of Incorporation, held to be equivalent of law. 
If there was any inference drawn by the jury that 
counsel for the Appellants was trying to deceive them as 
to what the law applicable to the situation was, the fault 
lay in the asking of an improper question, which called 
for an adverse ruling, rather than from the ruling itself, 
which we have demonstrated was perfectly proper. 
Appellants' counsel's statements and version do not 
correctly reflect the Record. He was given great lee-
way in cross examining witnesses and presenting his 
theory, which greatly limited defendant in the amount 
of time available to present its evidence. 
VII. PERMITTING THE JURY TO CARRY ON UNTIL 
ABOUT 10 P. M. WITH THE CASE. 
The Appellants cite a self serving affidavit filed by 
them in support of a motion for a new trial as authority 
for the proposition that they were not given sufficient 
notice to having witnesses present and testify, particu-
larly Dr. Freeman of Fillmore, Utah. The Record will 
show that at the end of the third day on Wednesday the 
following discussion occurred between the court and 
counsel: 
"The Court: * * *Let me inquire, how many 
more witnesses will we have on liability1 
"Mr. Hanson: We will have Your Honor, 
possibly three, one of whom will he rather long 
and the other two rather short. I won't say who 
they will he neceRsarily unless ~·ou want m~ to. 
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"The Court: No. 
"Thlr. Hanson: But there will be three wit-
nesses. 
"The Court: We will finish in good time by 
noon1 
'"Thir. Hanson: In addition to those three, 
there may be two other witnesses on the mechan-
ism of the truck. 
"The Court: We had better plan that we will 
have tomorrow on the liability, tomorrow morn-
ing. 
"Mr. Hanson: I think a good part of to-
morrow mornrng. 
"Mr. Schoenhals : Will I need any witnesses 
here tomorrow 1 
"The Court: If you have rebuttal on this lia-
bility, probably you should have them. 
"Mr. Schoenhals: By noon 1 
"The Court: He might not go more than 
eleven o'clock. We are Tunning behind our sched-
ule. Let's have them. 
"Mr. Hanson: If Your Honor please, I don't 
think we will go much more than eleven o'clock. 
"The Court: Probably you should have yours 
here by eleven o'clock." (R. 648) 
It, therefore, appears by the record that counsel for 
the plaintiffs was given ample notice that he should have 
any witnesses that he planned to use in rebuttal in court 
my 11 :00 A.M. Thursday morning. Now here in the Re·c-
ord does it appear that counsel for the plaintiffs made 
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any objection to the court's continuing on and complet-
ing the case Thursday evening. The fact is it was his 
suggestion at the commencement of the case that it 
wouldn't take longer. 
At the conclusion of the defendant's evidence, the 
Appellants were given an opportunity to put on their 
rebuttal (R. 819). At the conclusion of their rebuttal evi-
dence the Appellants rested (R. 846). 
Nothing was said at that time in regard to the Ap-
pellants' wishing to call another witness on Friday. ~\p­
pellants rested unqualifiedly. The Appellants' Brief 
goes into what it is claimed Dr. Freeman would have 
testified had he been called. However, nowhere in the 
Record is there any mention made that the Appellants 
planned to call Dr. Freeman or any offer of proof made 
as to what he might have been e.xpected to testify. He 
was never subpoenaed. 
Appellants argue that it appeared to the jury that it 
was the plaintiffs' fault that they were being retained 
until ten P.M. Such a conclusion was unwarranted. The 
trial was concluded earlier in the evening and the jury 
was being retained not by the plaintiffs but by the court. 
It is only natural that if they felt any resentment, the 
resentment would be manifested toward the court rather 
than toward either of the parties. Even assuming that the 
jury blamed the parties for their being there until 10 :00 
P.M., there appears to be no reason why they should 
blame the plaintiffs any more than the defendants. In 
other words, there appears to be no reason why the jury 
should be particularly prejudiced against the plaintiffs 
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by reason of the fact that they were required to stay un-
til 10 :00 p .~I. 
The jury in this case was not greatly inconvenienced 
or kept up during the evening. If this court were to hold 
the trial courts were required, without exception, to ad-
journ at the hour of 5:00 P.:M., regardless of the fact 
that a case might be finished inside of a few more hours, 
the holding would greatly hamper the administration of 
justice and add expense to the State. It was upon Appel-
lants' representations that there was need to go beyond 
the fourth day. ~lost of the time spent after 6 :00 P.M. 
was spent in instructing the jury and their deliberations 
in the jury roon1. 
The determination of the manner in which a trial 
or hearing is conducted is a matter which lies within the 
discretion of the trial court and should not be interferred 
with by this court unless it clearly appears that the trial 
court abused its discretion, and that the parties were not 
given a fair trial. 
In the case of Kern County Finance Co. v. Iriart 
(Cal.) 79 Pac. (2d) 764, counsel for one of the parties 
was committed to jail for a contempt of court in failing 
to obey its orders and admonitions. The claim was made 
that, by reason of loss of sleep, the counsel was too tired 
to continue with the case the following day. Nothing ap-
peared in the Record which indicated the incapacity of 
counsel except that he asked for an adjournment for the 
noon recess at ten minutes to twelve, which was granted. 
The court held that there was nothing prejudicial in the 
manner in which the case was conducted. 
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In Gunn v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 173 Pac. (2d) 3~~, 
counsel was given an hour to argue his case, which he 
claimed was insufficient to present his argument to the 
court. The court held : 
"The determination of the manner in which a 
trial or hearing in a court is to be carried on lies 
within the province of the court before which such 
proceeding is pending; and it is not for an appel-
late court to say that it should have proceeded in 
one way or another as long as no statutory or con-
stitutional rights of the parties were infringed. 
And how much time parties may be allowed for 
argument in a trial before a court sitting without 
a jury, or whether they are to be allowed any at 
all, are matters within the discretion of the court 
before whom the hearing is had." 
Thus it is seen that the manner in which the trial 
is conducted is a matter within the discretion of the trial 
judge. The appellate court should not give its opinion 
as to how this trial court should have proceeded unless it 
appears that there was clearly an abuse of that discre-
tion. From an examination of the Record in this ra~~, 
it appears that the Appellants were given every oppor-
tunity to present their evidence and argument. In a trial 
which lasted four days with a very simple issue of fact, 
approximately the first two and one-half days and the 
last half day were taken by the Appellants. Out of the 
four days, the Appellants consumed approximately three. 
It is submitted that they now have no valid grounds for 
complaint. 
VIII. STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. 
It is asserted that counsel for the defendant, during-
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the course of his argu1uent, extended his hand to the 
driver of the defendant's truck, who is supposed to have 
displayed a "long, sad and forlorn face" and stated that 
the plaintiffs had charged him with the responsibility of 
the death of the people involYed. This matter is nowhere 
in the Record, and the e.xaggerations of counsel for Ap-
pellants are neither justified nor substantiated, nor do we 
find any objection in the Record as to any misconduct of 
counsel during closing argument. This fact alone should 
dispose of counsel's argument on this point. 
However, if the statement was made, it is not under-
stood how it can be objectionable, since the statement 
is a true appraisal of the situation. Plaintiff's charged 
the defendant in their complaint and all through the trial 
with negligently causing the death and injury of the 
people involved. This was the very essence of their case. 
Of course, the defendant, being a fictional entity, could 
only act through some person. The driver and other 
agents or servants of the defendant having the custody, 
control and management of the vehicle, the instrumental-
ity through which or upon which they operated, were the 
persons through whom the defendant acted. In reality 
then, any accusation against the defendant was an accu-
sation of the persons through whom the defendant acted. 
rrhe driver here, in every sense of the word, was being 
charged, along with other employees and agents of the 
defendant, with negligently causing the death or injury 
of the persons involved, and this assignment of error is 
without any basis. 
IX. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES. 
Pages 256-260 of the Record will show the proceed-
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ings which went on at the commencement of the trial in 
chambers relative to the exclusion of witnesses. The Rec-
ord will show that all of the defendant's witnesses, with 
the exception of Laren Somsen, were excluded from the 
court room. The Record does not show that the Appel-
lants ever objected to Mr. Somsen's remaining in the 
court room and it was determined if not agreed in cham-
bers that defendant could have its driver and employee 
present. Appellants cannot now be heard to object to 
something to which they had no objections at the time 
the arrangements were made in chambers, and no objec-
tion was made at the time of trial. 
"It has been said that where the rule regard-
ing the exclusion of witnesses from the court-
room is invoked, unless some good reason is 
shown, all of the witnesses should be included. 
There are, however, some exceptions to the rule 
which are generally recognized. F'or example, the 
rules do not apply to a party to the action( and a 
corporation can only be represented by an em-
ployee), although there may be several parties 
on one side of the case. The same is true of one 
directly interested in the result of the trial. It is 
also said that the rule is inapplicable to an attor-
ney for one of the parties, even though he is also 
represented on the trial by other attorneys; but 
the action of the trial court in excluding one of 
the attorneys for a party has been upheld. An 
sxception to the rule has been applied in favor 
of a detective attached to the office of the prose-
cuting attorney or other officer whose duty it i~ 
to assist that officer in preparing cases. While it 
is usual also to except expert witnesses from the 
rule, a refusal to do so is in error and it has been 
62 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said that witnesses in rebuttal do not go under 
the rule." 53 Am. Jur. -!7. 
The defendant in this case was a corporation. Laren 
Somsen was an e1nployee of that corporation and knew 
more about this particular accident and was more di-
rectly involved than any other agent or en1ployee of the 
corporation. When a corporation is a party to a lawsuit, 
it has a right to be represented by some agent or employ-
ee of the corporation in the same manner as any other 
party. The fact that the agent or employee may also be 
a witness, should no more exclude him from the trial than 
any party to a lawsuit. 
The reason for the rule excluding witnesses is to pre-
vent witnesses from modifying their testimony to coin-
cide to the testimony given by prior witnesses, which is 
a very desirable objective. On the other hand, we must 
not so tie an attorney's hands that he is unable to present 
his case or defense intelligently and effectively. He must 
have available to him during the course of the trial some-
one who is thoroughly acquainted with the facts of the 
accident. This principle has been recognized in a number 
of similar cases where courts have refused to exclude 
complaining witnesses and, as illustrated by the citation 
above, have refused to exclude a detective or other offi-
cers who have assisted in the preparation of a case. 
In this case, then, we see that Laren Somsen was 
the only employee of the company thoroughly acquainted 
with the facts of the accident and had a right to repre-
sent his company in the courtroom and his presence was 
absolutely necessary for counsel to have available to them 
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information necessary to the defense of the action. Even 
had the Appellants objected to his remaining in the court-
room, their objection would not have been well taken, and 
no objection was made. 
X. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Appellants seem to base their argument for a new 
trial on a conflict of the evidence as to whether certain 
marks on the highway were ma~e by an automobile 
driven by Horace Clark or by another Mercury automo-
bile. In this regard they claim that they were surprised 
by the evidence of I-Iorace Clark and that they did not 
have an opportunity to call the witnesses Hal Noyes, 
James F'aile, Roy Talbot and a Dr. Freeman. An exami-
nation of the testirnony of James Faile will indicate that 
the Appellants' counsel knew of the conflict of evidence 
which might arise in regard to the Mercury skid marks. 
Statements taken by him from Noyes, Talbot and Faile 
soon after the accident were not placed in the Record by 
counsel for Appellants. The evidence indicates that 
counsel had gone over this aspect of the case with the 
witness James Faile et al in detail prior to the trial. He 
had had the witness place certain marks on E~ibit ''P", 
anticipating the very conflict which occurred (R. 789). 
There is, therefore, no reason why Appellants should 
have been surprised by this evidence. 
Moreover, the Record indicates that the Appellants 
had earlier examined each of the witnesses Noyes, Faile 
and Talbot. Each of these witnesses had testified con-
cerning the marks made by the Mercury automobile on 
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direct Pxrunination and had been cross-examined by the 
Appellants concerning the same (see pages 7 -l--t-, 784, 803, 
809 of the Record). 
As to the claim that the witnesses F'aile, Noyes and 
Talbot were excluded, or we presun1e otherwise unavail-
able, when defendant presented Clark's testimony, the 
evidence shows that the witnesses Noyes and Talbot had 
been previously excused by the court after the court had 
asked counsel if there were any objections and no objec-
tions had been forthcoming (R. 758-810). The Record is 
silent as to what happened to the witness Faile, but there 
is no evidence that that witness was not immediately 
available and certainly no evidence that counsel for the 
defendant did anything to exclude or conceal these wit-
nesses. 
There is no showing in the Record that the Appel-
lants requested any additional time to secure these wit-
nesses. Nor is there any statement or offer of proof in 
the Record as to what the witnesses would have testified 
about. There is no evidence in the Record that Appel-
lants so much as mentioned calling an additional wit-
ness, Dr. Freeman, or what that witness would have 
testified about. He was not subpoenaed and could have 
been if wan ted. 
After an adverse verdict had been rendered, it is a 
common practice for litigants to speculate on how the 
outcome of a case might have been modified if evidence 
which was not offered at the trial had been introduced. 
'l'he law requires something more than that a party be-
lieves or represents there might have been evidence which 
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was not presented. It requires some legal and justifiable 
excuse for the evidence not to have been presented. 
In this case, it appears that the Appellants had no reason 
to be surprised at the evidence concerning the marks 
made by the Mercury automobile. ~rhey did have an op-
portunity to e.xamine the witnesses Noyes, Faile and 
Talbot in regard to those marks. They were not deprived 
of their right of presenting any additional evidence which 
would have been proper. The court was, therefore, cor-
rect in denying the motion to grant a new trial. 
XI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
Appellants' argument is like the shot of a sawed-off 
shotgun which is designed to spread rapidly and covers 
a lot of ground. It is not specifically directed toward any 
point, but attempts to raise a multitude of items in the 
hope that they may hit upon something in which the court 
might find error. In the preceding part of Appellants' 
argument they argue that they should have a new trial 
on the ground that the witness James Faile was not given 
an opportunity to testify about the marks on the high-
way made by the Mercury automobile. In this part of 
the Brief, they attempt to argue that upon the basis of 
this witness's testimony concerning those marks they 
were entitled to a directed verdict. 
In this part of their Brief, as throughout the Brief, 
they attempt to argue the facts of the case. "r e have 
covered the facts in the previous part of this Brief and 
will briefly touch upon them later. At this point we pre-
fer to limit the argument to the legal principals invohed. 
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The rule that a party to an action may not refresh 
the memory or even cross-examine his own witness is not 
-~, without exception. Section 618, 58 Am. J ur. 342, cited 
by the Appellants in their Brief, provides: 
"A party ordinarily cannot cross-examine his 
own witnesses. The purpose of cross-examination 
is to test the truthfulness of the testimony given 
by witnesses of the adverse party and to develop 
and explain their testin1ony as developed in their 
direct examination. With respect to one's own wit-
ness, it is only when he is hostile or testifies ad-
versely that cross-examination is permitted. In 
the latter case, however, it is recognized that the 
witness 1nay be cross-sxamined, and leading ques-
tions may be put to him by the party calling him, 
for the very sensible and sufficient reason that 
he is adverse and that the danger arising from 
such a mode of examination by the party calling 
a friendly or unbiased witness does not exist. The 
right to cross-examine in such a case, however, is 
not absolute, but rests in the discretion of the trial 
judge. Under the rule, a prosecuting attorney 
may be allowed to cross-examine his own witness 
where the latter had materially weakened the 
effect of important testinwny given by hin1 on a 
previous trial." 
Section 799, 58 Am. J ur. 444 provides : 
"A recognized exception to the rule that a wit-
ness may not be impeached by the party at whose 
instance he testifies exists in the case of a witness 
who is hostile or unwilling, or who by his testi-
mony surprises the party calling him, provided 
the surprise is substantial. Well-recognized rea-
sons and principles of the law of evidence sup-
port the proposition that, at least in the discretion 
of the trial court, a party surprised by the ad-
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verse testimony of his own witness may show that 
the witness had made prior statements inconsist-
ent with, or contradictory of, the testimony which 
he gave. It would be grossly unfair to permit a 
witness to entrap a party into calling him by mak-
ing a statement, (especially an isolated conclu-
sion) favorable to that party's contention, and 
then, when he is called and accredited hy that 
party and gives testimony at variance with his 
previous statement and against that party's inter-
est, to deny the party calling him the right to 
show that he was induced to do so by a previous 
statement of the witness made under such circum-
stances as to warrant a reasonable belief that the 
witness would repeat the statement when called 
to testify. But the court should be satisfied that 
the party has been taken by surprise, and that the 
testimony is contrary to what he had just cause to 
expect from the witness based upon his state-
ments. Moreover, the staternents must be contra-
dictory of the witness' testirnony." 
See also Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 Pac. 
(2d) 434. 
An e.xamination of the Record will show that on di-
rect examination, and as heretofore quoted from the 
Record, the witness Faile testified concerning the l\fer-
cury marks in a manner favorable to the defendants con-
sistent with the other witnesses. (R. 779-784) On cross-
examination, the witness while necessarily acknowledg-
ing signing the affidavits tried to explain, but was cut 
off by counsel for respondents (R. 784-791). On redirect 
examination, counsel for the defendant merely sought 
to show that statements the witness had made prior to 
the trial indicated, that he would testify as had been in-
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dicated by his direct exan1ination and that his testinwny 
on cross-exrunination came as a surprise. There can be 
no question but that the defendailt was surprised, other-
wise defendants would not have called him as a witness 
and that the redirect examination of the witness clearly 
fell within the s~ception to the rule that a party cailno't 
cross-examine or impeach his own witness. 
A reading of the witness F'ailes' testimony (R. 779-
805) will reveal that the testimony of this witness was 
not as favorable to appellant as it is asserted to be in the 
appellant's brief. The marks which appellant claims were 
made by the iliercury, rather than gtudebaker, extend-
ed into the debris of the collision. On direct examination 
this witness was asked : 
"Q. Did the Mercury get into the debris at 
all before it came to a stop?" 
"A. I don't think it did." (R. 784) 
On cross-examination he admitted that he had ob-
served plaintiff's Exhibit PP in plaintiff's counsel's office 
and initialed certain marks contained therein, as the 
marks made by the Mercury automobile. On redirect 
exan1ination, he testified that he had been up to counsel 
for the plaintiff's office about two or three weeks prior 
to the trial and had made the marks on Exhibit PP (R. 
793). On redirect examination, he reiterated his prior 
testimony on direct examination, as given in the court 
reporter's statement. It was for the jury to weigh his 
testimony, However, in determining the question of 
whether or not the court should have granted plaintiff's 
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1notion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we 
should keep in mind that his testimony that the marks 
which appellant claims were made by the :Mercury rather 
than the Studebaker were not made by the Mercury, 
was corroborated by three other independent witnesses, 
Hal Noyes, Roy Talbot and Horace Clark and the affi-
davits concealed by counsel for respondent were used 
as impeaching rather than direct evidence. It is, there-
fore, subn1itted that there was not sufficient evidence 
upon which the court could have set aside the verdict and 
entered judgment in the plaintiff's favor. 
XII. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT PLAIN-
TIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CULBERT 
ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES. 
The record does not bear out appellant's contention 
that he was not permitted to cross-examine either of the 
witnesses Culbert Robinson or the witness Hal Noyes. His 
cross-examination of Culbert Robinson will be found in 
the Record on Pages 610-618. Appellant's recross-exami-
nation of Culbert Robinson will be found in the Record 
on page 620. His cross-examination of the witness Hal 
Noyes will be found on pages 744 to 758 of the Record. 
While appellants claim that they were not given 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness Culbert 
Robinson, the only specific parts of the testimony they 
refer to is a ruling on the propriety of asking the Sheriff 
whether or not there was a law in the Stat<> of 1 Ttah whi<'h 
requires brakes to be adjusted equally on each side so 
that they will lay down equal tract~ on each side, ( R. 
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611-lS R. 617 -6) which is not the first time counsel for 
respondent has reargued this point. 
Upon objection from the defendant's counsel, the 
Sheriff was not pennitted to answer either of the ques-
tions upon the grounds that the questions called for a 
conclusion of the law and that it was the court's function 
rather than the witnesses to instruct the jury as to what 
law was. 
On page 756 of the Record, counsel attempted to go 
into the location of certain marks on the Studebaker 
automobile. There had been no testimony on direct ex-
amination concerning any of such marks on the Stude-
baker or otherwise. The objection to the question was 
sustained on the theory that it went beyond the scope of 
direct examination. Again on Page 756 counsel for the 
defendant asked Mr. Noyes: 
"Q. Mr. Noyes, did you or did you not con-
vince yourself that things had occurred at that 
accident that you did not observe f' 
The question was objected to on the grounds that it 
was speculative. The court ruled: 
"The Court. The objection is sustained. He 
may tell this jury what he saw or what he knows 
about it." 
It, therefore, appears that counsel for the appellant 
was not precluded from cross-examining the witness 
Culbert Robinson and Hal Noyes, but was merely pre-
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SUMMARY 
In this case the jury, after four days of trial on the 
question of liability, by their answers to the special in-
terrogatories absolved the defendant from any blame for 
the accident out of which this action arises. 
A reading of the voluminous record in the case evi-
dences the fact that plaintiffs were given every oppor-
tunity to present their evidence to the court and indeed 
availed themselves of that opportunity to the extent of 
three-fourths of the entire time taken up by the trial 
in the presentation of their evidence. The accident in-
volved two vehicles approaching each other on a high-
way approximately 24 feet in width, each driving in 
opposite directions. There was only one basis of negli-
gence which could have been the ultimate cause of the 
accident, and certainly this was determined and ac-
knowledged at the pre-trial, namely that one or the other 
of the two vehicles was driven onto the wrong side of 
the highway prior to the impact. The ultimate issue as 
determined at the pre-trial was also evident in the man-
ner in which each side presented their evidence. Plaintiffs' 
theory was clearly to sh~w that the impact occurred wen 
on plaintiffs' side of the road and they similarly dis-
claimed that any impact could have occurred as claimed 
by defendant. 
Considerable has been said by Appellants to the ef-
fect that the brakes on defendant's vehicle were im-
properly adjusted and maintained in such a manner a~ 
to cause the vehicle to veer to the left upon an appJica-
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tion of the brakes. Plaintiffs were permitted to present 
this theory in great detail and to exmnine their experts 
sxtensively. In the last analysis, however, the testimony 
was merely evidence of the ultiinate issue as to which 
driver drove onto the wrong side of the highway. Appel-
lants assert the trial judge was prejudiced against them 
and he committed errors in the conduct of the trial. Ac-
tually a reading of all the testimony at the time of the 
trial will dislose that the trial court, if anything, leaned 
over backwards in the paintiffs' favor in allowing them 
to get all of their evidence before the jury. Only in those 
cases where the infraction of the rules were too flagrant 
to be overlooked did the court sustain an objection to 
any of the questions or preclude the admission of any 
evidence. Counsel for Appellants repeatedly asked lead-
ing and suggestive questions and demonstrated the acci-
dent before the jury while examining their witnesses. 
Even cellophane overlays, prepared prior to trial, were 
used to direct the witnesses. These were ingeniously 
marked in color with distances to portray exactly how 
counsel claimed the accident occurred. The court pa-
tiently permitted plaintiffs to present all of such evi-
dence and in the end fairly submitted the issue to the 
jury. The jury unanimously and unmistakably found that 
the Studebaker was negligently driven across the high-
way just before the impact and that defendant's truck 
was not. Certai~ly the jury was justified, and we believe 
most certainly correct, in not permitting the accident to 
he re-constructed and in finding a verdict which was 
hased upon the clear preponderance of the evidence anq 
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the testimony of dis-interested eye witnesses corro-
borated by the marks and measurements as explained by 
the investigating officers. 
A reading of the Record further shows that plaintiffs 
relied essentially upon conjecture and supposition. Coun-
sel for Appellants based his theory upon the assumption 
that certain marks on the highway were made by certain 
tires on the defendant's vehicle and that those tires would 
have reacted in a certain way upon an impact between the 
two vehicles. If the jury chose not to believe any one of 
these suppositions or assumptions, plaintiffs' entire case 
must fall. One of many unreasonable assumptions was 
the assumption that Laren Somsen, driver of defendant's 
vehicle, which was rounding a gradual curve well on its 
own side at 37 miles per hour, would have any occasion to 
apply the brakes of the tractor in the manner in which 
they were applied or turn from his course unless some 
emergency situation presented itself to the driver. That 
emergency was the sudden entry of the Studebaker auto-
mobile over into his lane of traffic. 
Counsel for Appellants, under his theory, expected 
the jury to entirely disregard the other evidence in the 
case and the eye witnesses and rely solely upon the vaguP 
testimony of Bowman et al and the opinion testimony of 
experts. The danger of placing too much emphasis on 
this type of evidence is apparent. In an automobile acei-
dent there are so many factors of such variable nature 
which must be taken into consideration that no expert, no 
matter how skilled, could arrive at a conclusion which 
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would not be subject to question. This principal has 
been recognized by some jurisdictions to the extent that 
an opinion of an sxpert as to the ultimate cause of an 
accident has been held to be inadn1issable and, in any 
event, strictly limited. 
"* * * Smne of the courts lay down the rule 
that, in such case, to permit an expert to state even 
an answer to a hypothetical question, what was 
the cause of the accident would be to invade the 
jury's domain and, therefore, that such an opinion 
is inadmissible." 20 Am. Jur. 688. 
In the case of Fishman v. Silva (Cal.), 2 Pac. (2d) 
473, with reference to the use of opinion and expert 
testimony in automobile cases, said the court: 
"* * * It is needless to add, as in all such 
cases, there is presented a wide field for argument, 
the main theme of which is physical facts and the 
so-called i1nmutable laws of physics. Contentions 
based on these foundations are usually not con-
vincing, strange as it may seem, for the simple 
reason that in partisan presentation there is an 
ever present temptation to forget essential facts 
which do not fit in. For instance, where it is ar-
gued that, where there is a contact of two bodies 
in a given position, the direction of the applied 
force will control the position of the bodies after 
the impact, any rule or law, in the abstract, will be 
found of little value when we have the additional 
factors of each body in motion and controlled by 
independent agencies. Experience has shown the 
futility of attempted demonstration in accident 
cases ; there are too many varying factors. Among 
these variants we may class indefinite rate of 
speed, condition of the highway, judgment or lack 
thereof in the drivers, a direct blow or a glancing 
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one, and the balance or equilibriun1 of each car 
at the time of impact. * * *" 
In Johnston v. Peairs, (Cal.), 3 Pac. (2d) 617 several 
experts were produced to show that when two cars came 
into collision under the circumstances shown by the eYi-
dence one of them would necessarily be up-set and that 
it would be physically and mechanically impossible for 
the one car to travel the 45 feet it did travel after the 
collision to strike plaintiff. Error was assigned on ap-
peal for the failure of the lower court to admit in evi-
dence the opinion testimony: 
"The refusal of the court to admit such te8ti-
mony is assigned as error. It is appellant's con-
tention that expert testimony was admissible to 
prove that these cars could not, if struck in the 
manner and under the circumstances testified to 
by plaintiff's witnesses, have moved or come to 
rest in the manner also testified to. Such a eon-
tention is well answered in the case of Fishman Y. 
Silva (Cal. App.) 2 P. (2d) 473,474. * * *" 
The court then went on to quote the language in the 
Silva case above mentioned and held that it was not error 
to exclude such expert opinions. 
In Moniz v. Bettencourt (Cal.), 76 Pac. (2d) 535, in 
holding sxpert opinion testimony was properly excluded, 
the court added : 
"Courts look with disfavor upon thi~ type of 
testimony upon the ground that it i~ impossible 
to establish all of tlie neee:-;~ary elemenb sneh a~ 
the reaction of the human mi1~d under a e<>rtain 
set of circumstances; the impossibility of having 
complete knowledge of the exac·t Rpeed, course of 
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Notwithstanding the questionable nature of plain-
tiffs' opinion expert testimony, plaintiffs were allowed 
great leeway in examining their expert witnesses as well 
as their lay witnesses. If such evidence could have been 
sufficient to establish an accident on the east side of the 
highway, certainly the expert testimony produced by de-
fendant through Srun Taylor equally showed that the im-
pact could have been on defendant's right hand side. 
~lore important than any of the expert testilnony, 
however, were the actual eye witnesses to the accident 
and the physical evidence on the highway. The independ-
ent witnesses Hal ~oyes, James Faile and Roy Talbot 
were following defendant's vehicle down the highway 
and two of them, namely Noyes and Faile, saw the impact 
as it occurred three or four feet from the edge of defend-
ant's shoulder. This testimony was corroborated by the 
unmistakable physical evidence examined by the investi-
gating officers the morning the accident occurred. 
It must be remembered that defendant's driver had 
only an appro.x;imate second's warning when the Stude-
baker swung across the highway into a crab-like rnotion, 
traveling at a terrific speed about 80 miles per hour. 
rrhis, with the combined speed of defendant's tractor (37 
miles per hour), made a resulting combined force of ap-
proximately 117 miles per hour, resulting in the explo-
sive forces. There was no time for planned or deliberate 
action on the part of defendant's driver. He said he may 
have instinctively started to turn to the left to avoid the 
impact and the eye witnesses thought that he had started 
to ~w turn. The impact, coming in against the right front 
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of defendant's tractor, bent and pushed back the right 
front corner and wheel, locking the wheel and flattening 
the right front tire. It also flattened the left front tire 
of the Studebaker. Apparently a scissor-like action fol-
lowed, which accounts for the marks on the side of the 
Studebaker and the damage and marks on the side of de-
fendant's rig, all of which were described and accounted 
for by Sam Taylor who carefully examined both vehicles. 
It also accounts for the tire n1arks of the Studebaker 
which were traceable by the officers from the area of the 
impact across the shoulder and to the point where the 
Studebaker came to rest. Tracing back from the scene of 
the accident, the Studebaker tire marks, as testified to by 
the officers, were clearly traceable from where it first 
entered the curve, getting onto its right shoulder and 
then swerving out of control to the point of impact and 
thus to where it came to rest. 
At some point after the collision the crescent was 
evidently gouged by the rim of the left front wheel of 
the Studebaker. 
Exhibit "B" clearly shows the wavey marks caused 
from the flattened tire of the defendant's right front 
wheel. The investigating officers testified how this flat 
tire mark was easily traced on through to the right front 
wheel. This type of 1nark certainly was suggestive of 
plaintiffs' theory that there were zig zag marks. Plain-
tiffs' witnesses denied that there were any marks from 
the flattened tire as shown in Exhibit "B". 
Had the impact occurred where claimed by counsel 
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driver, Laren Son1sen, could have 8topped where he did 
almost instantaneously with the alleged impaet on the 
east side. 
It would be hard to believe that the vague tire marks 
claimed to ha Ye been observed by Bowman et al the day 
after the accident were n1ade by the Studebaker or even 
related to the accident. Such evidence was certainly 
questionable especially when no e;xamination was made 
by any of the plaintiffs' witnesses the day the accident 
occurred and only after there had been considerable traf-
fic. The investigating officers said there were no such 
marks. 
Nor was the claim as to the Mercury marks suffi-
cient to require the jury to disregard the testimony of 
the eye witnesses and the investigating officers. There 
was ample and convincing evidence that when the Mer-
cury stopped it came nowhere near the debris. Counsel's 
suggestion that there may have been two Mercurys is 
pure speculation and in any event there is no direct evi-
dence that the marks examined by the officers were 
caused by a Mercury. 
In the trial of the case the court, out of liberality to 
plaintiffs, left the issue for the jury. The jury returned 
clear and unqualified answers in favor of defendant and 
their verdict was based on the testimony of disinterested 
eye witnesses corroborated by the clear physical facts as 
witnessed by the investigating officers and others pres-
ent immediately following the accident. 
Appellants, in assigning everything imaginable as 
error, have failed in many instances to refer to any of 
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the Record and in other instances they have made bold 
assertions and conclusions not justified by the Record. 
A review of the proceedings shows that the court fairly 
and impartially tried the case and that there was no 
prejudicial error committed during the course of the trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
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